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More than ever before, our lives are visible to others, from 
government agencies and security services to the owners 
of the websites we surf and the stores where we shop.  
They track us in public, in workplaces and online, 
compiling our personal information in massive databases 
and sorting us into categories of risk, value and 
trustworthiness.2   
Shockingly, a significant portion of the information about us which 
is visible to others is made visible by us.3   
Two hundred forty million Americans use the Internet.4  We 
shop online,5 make online travel reservations,6 bank online,7 visit 
government websites,8 use social media websites,9 and engage in a 
myriad of other Internet transactions.  In doing so, we reveal our 
 
 1. Robert L. Mitchell, The Grill: Privacy Is a Thing of the Past, Says Private Investigator, 
COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 10, 2008, 12:00 PM), http://www.computerworld.com
/s/article/326821/The_Grill_Privacy_is_a_thing_of_the_past_says_private_investigator
?nlid=1&source=NLT_AM; Steve Rambam, Privacy Is Dead—Get Over It, GOOGLE VIDEOS 
(Jan. 28, 2011), http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-383709537384528624.  
Steve Rambam is the controversial founder and CEO of Pallorium, Inc., a private 
investigations firm, and owner of PallTech, an investigative database service with 
more than 25 billion records on United States citizens and businesses.  Mitchell, 
supra. 
 2. Don Butler, Big Brother Is Watching, More Than Ever Before, THE VANCOUVER 
SUN, Feb. 3, 2009, at F8; Don Butler, Are We Addicted to Being Watched?, OTTAWA 
CITIZEN (Jan. 31, 2009), http://www2.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/observer
/story.html?id=ade6d795-4e7a-4ede-9fc1-f7bf929849c8. 
 3. One study reported that eighty-nine percent of Internet users have 
voluntarily revealed personal information online.  Carrie-Ann Skinner, Majority of 
Web Users Share Personal Data Online, COMPUTERWORLD (Aug. 12, 2008, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9112302/Majority_of_Web_users_shar
e_personal_data_online?taxonomyId=84&intsrc=kc_feat&taxonomyName=privacy.  
 4. Top 20 Countries with the Highest Number of Internet Users, INTERNET WORLD 
STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/top20.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2011). 
 5. Seventy-one percent of adult Internet users shop online.  Generational Differences 
in Online Activities, PEW INTERNET (Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.pewinternet.org
/Infographics/Generational-differences-in-online-activities.aspx. 
 6. Sixty-eight percent of adult Internet users make travel reservations online.  
Id. 
 7. Fifty-five percent of adult Internet users bank online.  Id.     
 8. Fifty-nine percent of adult Internet users visit government websites.  Id.   
 9. Thirty-five percent of adult Internet users use social networking sites.  Id.   
3
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names, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, credit 
card numbers, and a plethora of other “personally identifying 
information.”10  We seemingly trust that the websites to whom we 
give this information will handle the information responsibly and 
refrain from disclosing the information in any way we do not 
intend or that may do us harm.  Yet those sites use our personally 
identifying information to predict our behavior, to deliver 
advertising based upon the interests and habits gleaned from that 
information, and, ultimately, to generate revenue.11 
This article is intended to be a discussion of the legal aspects 
of Internet privacy,12 the right and ability to control what 
information one reveals about oneself over the Internet, who can 
access that information, and how that information can be used.  It 
is not intended to be a discussion of Internet security, which is a 
related topic but focuses on the way that information (including, 
but not limited to, personally identifying information) is protected 
against unauthorized access, use, disclosure, and loss or 
destruction.13  We presume, as many others have concluded,14 that 
Internet privacy is important and trouble ourselves only with the 
mechanism by which our Internet privacy may be enhanced. 
 
 10. Generally speaking, “personally identifying information” or “PII” is 
information which can be used to identify an individual, such as that person’s 
name, address, email address, credit card number, or Social Security number.  See 
generally Internet Privacy: Comparison of Federal Agency Practices with FTC’s Fair 
Information Principles: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms., Trade, and Consumer 
Prot. of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 2 (2000) [hereinafter Internet Privacy 
Hearings] (statement of Linda D. Koontz, Director, Information Management 
Issues), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01113t.pdf (discussing a 
federal study regarding the PII that different federal websites obtain). 
 11. See, e.g., Facebook Sponsored Stories: Letting Companies Use User Content to Advertise, 
L.A. TIMES TECHNOLOGY BLOG (Jan. 25, 2011, 5:40 PM), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2011/01/facebook-sponsored-stories 
-allow-companies-use-status-updates-places-check-ins-to-advertise.html (discussing a 
new Facebook feature that will allow companies to take user content and turn it 
into an advertisement). 
 12.  “‘Information privacy’ is the term theorists use to discuss the privacy 
implications of the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information.”  
Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information 
Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1413 n.118 (2001) (discussing privacy problems with 
databases). 
 13. Internet Privacy Hearings, supra note 10, at 6. 
 14. See, e.g., Rachel K. Zimmerman, Note, The Way the “Cookies” Crumble: 
Internet Privacy and Data Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 439 (2000) (discussing the threats the Internet poses to personal 
privacy and proposing a multi-faceted solution that includes both constitutional 
and statutory remedies). 
4
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Part II of this article describes the current federal regulatory 
and statutory scheme devoted to Internet privacy and addresses the 
legislative actions taken by a few states to address the issue.15  Part 
III describes the Internet privacy standards articulated by a few 
foreign nations—the European Union, United Kingdom, and 
Canada.16  Part IV describes notable attempts to privately enforce 
Internet privacy rights through litigation.17  Finally, Part V makes a 
case for the enactment of omnibus federal Internet privacy 
legislation, which leverages private enforcement to enhance the 
Internet privacy of all U.S. citizens.18 
II. CURRENT PROTECTIONS 
A. The Federal Trade Commission 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the primary 
governing body tasked with the responsibility of protecting the 
privacy of information gathered online.  The FTC derives its 
authority from section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 
(FTCA), which broadly prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in the marketplace.19  Under the FTCA, the FTC has the 
power to extend online data protection by rulemaking.20  However, 
rather than promulgate privacy rules, the FTC largely subscribes to 
a policy of “self-regulation” for most industry sectors.21  With the 
 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. See infra Part V. 
 19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006).  Specifically, section 5(a) provides that “unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce . . . are . . . declared 
unlawful.”  Id. § 45(a)(1). 
 20. Id. § 57a(a) (“[T]he Commission may prescribe . . . rules which define with 
specificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce (within the meaning of [section 45(a)(1) of this title] . . . .”). 
 21. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS i–ii (June 
1998) [hereinafter PRIVACY ONLINE], available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports
/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf  (“The Commission has been involved in addressing online 
privacy issues for almost as long as there has been an online marketplace and has 
held a series of workshops and hearings on such issues.  Throughout, the 
Commission’s goal has been to encourage and facilitate effective self-regulation as 
the preferred approach to protecting consumer privacy online.”); see also FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 6 
(July 1999) [hereinafter SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/07/privacy99.pdf (discussing the state of online 
privacy self-regulation).  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has consistently 
stated that “self-regulation is the least intrusive and most efficient means to ensure 
5
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exception of financial services companies, health care providers, 
and web businesses that target children, the FTC permits the vast 
majority of businesses to establish their own privacy standards.22  
Accordingly, the FTC is only empowered to bring an enforcement 
action against a company if it makes false representations in its 
privacy policies that amount to “unfair or deceptive trade 
practices.”23  As a result, the FTC is constrained in its power to 
impact privacy protection in a meaningful way. 
1. A Historical Look at the FTC’s Approach to Internet Privacy 
The FTC has endorsed two privacy models in the past fifteen 
years.24  Starting in the mid-1990s, the FTC approached privacy 
policies, practices, and self-regulatory principles through the lens 
of fair information practices.25  The FTC adopted, as the hallmarks 
of its self-regulation standards, the core principles of fair 
information practices, namely Notice, Choice, Access, and 
Security.26  Of the four principles, the FTC placed the greatest 
emphasis on the principle of notice and successfully advocated for 
privacy policies as an industry norm.27  During this time, the FTC, 
 
fair information practices, given the rapidly evolving nature of the Internet and 
computer technology.”  Id.  
 22. CHARLES H. KENNEDY, THE BUSINESS PRIVACY LAW HANDBOOK 3 (2008) 
(“[O]nline businesses in the United States are free to collect, use, and disclose 
personal information in any way they choose, so long as those practices do not 
violate commitments they have made to parties providing that information.  Put 
another way, American businesses generally are subject only to the online personal 
information rules they impose on themselves.”). 
 23. Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2055, 2114 (2004) (“[T]he agency is powerless—absent a specific statutory grant 
of authority—to regulate the collection of personal data by companies that either 
make no promises about their privacy practices or tell individuals that they will 
engage in unrestricted use and transfer of their personal data.”). 
 24. Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at Proskauer 
on Privacy 1 (Oct. 19, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches
/brill/101019proskauerspeech.pdf. 
 25. Id. 
 26. PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 21, at 7; see also Internet Privacy Hearings, supra 
note 10, at 2 (defining the four core principles: notice means that “[d]ata 
collectors must disclose their information practices before collecting personal 
information from consumers;” choice means that “[c]onsumers must be given 
options with respect to whether and how personal information” is collected and 
how it may be used; access means that “[c]onsumers should be able to view and 
contest the accuracy and completeness of information collected about them;” and 
security means “[d]ata collectors must take reasonable steps to ensure that 
information collected from consumers is . . . secure from unauthorized use.”). 
 27. HAROLD F. TIPTON & MICKI KRAUSE, INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT 
6
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the states, and consumer advocate groups appealed to Congress to 
codify the fair information practices into law, but Congress refused 
to enact any such federal omnibus scheme.28 
As the market progressed, the burden fell on the consumer to 
navigate incomprehensible privacy policies.29  In response, the FTC 
shifted its approach in the early part of the decade to a “harm-
based” model designed to prevent tangible harm to consumers, 
such as harm from security breaches and harmful uses of 
information that cause economic injury.30  The FTC targeted 
identity theft, spam, spyware, and children’s privacy as its primary 
privacy initiatives.31  As a result, the FTC focused its limited 
resources on security enforcement actions to address tangible 
harms to consumers, rather than privacy enforcement actions.  In 
the past decade, the FTC has prosecuted twenty-five security 
enforcement actions and only four privacy enforcement actions.32 
2. The FTC’s Privacy Enforcement Actions 
The FTC has broad discretion with regard to the enforcement 
actions it brings, yet it is limited by its statutory authority and 
financial resources.33  Ironically, as the FTC’s enforcement actions 
 
HANDBOOK 2731 (6th ed. 2007) (noting that “almost all the top 100 commercial 
sites now post privacy policies” (citation omitted)). 
 28. Brill, supra note 24, at 2.  
 29. David Vladeck, Dir., Fed. Trade Comm’n Bureau of Consumer Prot., The 
Role of the FTC in Consumer Privacy Protection, Remarks Before the 
International Association of Privacy Professionals 9 (Dec. 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/vladeck/091208iapp.pdf; see also Jon Leibowitz, 
Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Concurring Statement Regarding FTC Staff 
Report: Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising 3 n.2 (Feb. 
2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P085400behavadleibowitz.pdf 
(“A study of the privacy policies of Fortune 500 companies found that they were 
essentially incomprehensible for the majority of Internet users.  Only one percent 
of the privacy policies were understandable for those with a high school education 
or less (like most teens and many consumers).  Thirty percent of the privacy 
policies required a post-graduate education to be fully understood.” (citing FELICIA 
WILLIAMS, INTERNET PRIVACY POLICIES: A COMPOSITE INDEX FOR MEASURING 
COMPLIANCE TO THE FAIR INFORMATION PRINCIPLES 17, 18 tbl.2 (2006), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/behavioraladvertising/071010feliciawilliams.pdf)). 
 30. Brill, supra note 24, at 2; Vladeck, supra note 29, at 3. 
 31. Brill, supra note 24, at 2. 
 32. See Privacy Initiatives, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/privacy
/privacyinitiatives/promises_press.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2011) (listing various 
press releases detailing prosecution of security and privacy enforcement actions by 
the FTC) (accessed by searching for the website at http://web.archive.org). 
 33. Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. 
REV. 2041, 2056 (2000) (“[I]n principle, [the FTC] could bring enforcement 
7
Frieden et al.: Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: Leveraging Private Enforcem
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
  
1678 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:4 
demonstrate, a company that has a privacy policy is subject to an 
FTC privacy enforcement action, whereas a company without a 
policy would not be.34 
In 1998, the FTC brought its first Internet privacy enforcement 
action against GeoCities, one of the most popular sites on the 
Internet at the time.35  The FTC alleged that GeoCities 
misrepresented the purpose for which it was collecting personally 
identifying information from children and adults.36  Through its 
consumer registration process on its site, GeoCities created a 
database with email and postal addresses, member interest areas, 
income, education, gender, marital status, and occupation.37  
According to the FTC, GeoCities disclosed personally identifying 
information to third-party advertisers for targeted advertising.38  
The enforcement action resulted in a settlement which, most 
notably, required GeoCities to post on its site a clear and 
prominent privacy notice that disclosed to consumers the type of 
information it collected, the purpose of collecting that 
information, to whom it would disclose that information, and how 
consumers could access and remove their personal information.  
GeoCities was also required to obtain parental consent before 
collecting information from children twelve years old and under,39 





actions against websites merely on the basis of ‘unfair’ practices.”).  However, 
Hetcher contends that the FTC is prevented from doing so for political and 
practical reasons.  Id.  Practically, there are too many websites that are in violation 
of the FTC’s fair information principles.  Id.  Politically, the approach in 
Washington has been towards “governmental non-interference with the Internet.”  
Id. 
 34. Id. at 2056–58 (“The Agency has never brought an enforcement action 
against a website merely for ‘unfair’ trade practices.”).  However, Hetcher 
contends that once the website publishes a privacy policy, the FTC has jurisdiction 
to bring an enforcement action.  Id.  (“Once websites make explicit statements on 
their websites regarding their informational practices, they are then in a position 
in which they must either live up to those promises or open themselves up to the 
charge of engaging in deceptive trade practices.”). 
 35. Internet Site Agrees to Settle FTC Charges of Deceptively Collecting Personal 
Information in Agency’s First Internet Privacy Case, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 13, 
1998), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/08/geocitie.shtm. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
8
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Similarly, in 2000, the FTC filed an enforcement action against 
ReverseAuction, an online auction site competitive with eBay.40  
The FTC alleged that ReverseAuction registered with eBay and 
agreed to eBay’s User Agreement and Privacy Policy to market and 
promote its new site.41  ReverseAuction subsequently harvested eBay 
users’ personally identifying information to send users unsolicited 
messages promoting its own online auction site in an attempt to 
divert users away from eBay.42  As part of the settlement, 
ReverseAuction was required to provide a privacy/notice policy on 
its website, refrain from using personally identifying information of 
eBay users who had not registered with ReverseAuction, and to 
create a process for consumers to cancel registration and have their 
personally identifying information deleted from ReverseAuction’s 
database.43  In the wake of the settlement, the Chairman of the FTC 
at the time stated: 
Confidence that privacy will be protected is an important 
element in consumers’ decisions where to shop on the 
Internet.  Self-regulatory efforts by e-businesses to protect 
their customers’ privacy should be encouraged.  But 
beyond self-regulation, those who violate consumers’ 
privacy should be promptly called to task.  Consumers 
should have confidence that their privacy choices will be 
protected.44 
Despite the FTC’s promises to improve Internet privacy protection, 
it continued to prosecute Internet security cases at a higher rate 
than privacy cases.45 
In 2004, the FTC brought an enforcement action against 
Gateway Learning Corporation (Gateway), the company that 
markets and sells the “Hooked on Phonics” brand, for making 
 
 40. Online Auction Site Settles FTC Privacy Charges, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 6, 
2000), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/01/reverse4.shtm. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.; see also Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at 
The Privacy 2001 Conference (Oct. 4, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov
/speeches/muris/privisp1002.shtm.  The subsequent chairman similarly 
announced plans to increase resources dedicated to privacy protection by fifty 
percent.  Id. (“We will enforce current laws vigorously, using more of the FTC’s 
resources.  We will stop those practices that are most harmful to consumers.  We 
will use our full arsenal of tools . . . to pursue our strong pro-privacy agenda 
addressing real privacy concerns.”). 
 45. See Privacy Initiatives, supra note 32 (listing a greater number of security 
cases than privacy cases). 
9
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material changes to its privacy policy without notifying consumers.46  
The FTC contended that Gateway rented consumers’ personal 
information to third-party advertisers, contrary to explicit promises 
made in its initial privacy policy.47  The FTC alleged that Gateway 
subsequently changed its privacy policy to allow for such disclosures 
to third-party advertisers, but continued to rent information 
collected under the initial policy without notifying consumers of 
the change.48  The settlement provided, in part, that Gateway was 
prohibited from sharing any personal information collected from 
consumers under its initial privacy policy, unless it obtained 
affirmative “opt-in” consent from consumers.49  The settlement also 
required Gateway to relinquish the $4,608 it earned from renting 
consumers’ information, which it paid to the Treasury rather than 
to consumers.50  This case was the first FTC enforcement action 
against a company for making material changes to its privacy policy 
without notifying consumers,51 sending a signal to companies that 
they are obligated to honor statements made in their privacy 
policies.52  However, some critics argue that the settlement was 
indicative of the FTC’s weak enforcement ability, as evidenced by 
the paltry fine and Gateway’s non-admission of liability.53 
In a similar case, the FTC brought an enforcement action 
against a company for renting consumers’ personal information to 
marketers in direct contravention to the privacy policies of the 
 
 46. Gateway Learning Settles FTC Privacy Charges, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jul. 7, 
2004), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/07/gateway.shtm. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Bill Grabarek, Gateway Learning Settles Privacy Charges, DIRECT MAG. (Aug. 
1, 2004), http://directmag.com/mag/marketing_gateway_learning_settles.  
According to Jessica Rich, an assistant director at the FTC at the time of the case, 
“[t]his is the first FTC case to allege deceptive and unfair practices in connection 
with a company’s material change to its privacy policy.”  Id. 
 52. FED. TRADE COMM’N, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL 
ADVERTISING 11–12 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02
/P085400behavadreport.pdf.  This case became the basis for one of the four 
governing principles of the FTC’s self-regulatory guide for behavioral marketing: 
“before a company uses behavioral data in a manner that is materially different 
from promises made when the company collected the data, it should obtain 
affirmative express consent from the consumer.”  Id.   
 53. Adam G. Todd, Painting a Moving Train: Adding “Postmodern” to the 
Taxonomy of Law, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 105, 139 (2008) (“The FTC’s rather weak 
enforcement ability is illustrated by the consent decree that the FTC entered into 
with Gateway . . . .”). 
10
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merchants with whom the company partnered.54  The FTC brought 
the case against Vision I Properties, LLC, doing business as 
CartManager International, a company that provides shopping cart 
software and related services to thousands of online merchants.55  
CartManager collected and rented the personal information, 
including the name, address, phone number, email address, credit 
card number, and buying information, of nearly one million 
consumers who shopped at merchant sites.56  The FTC alleged that 
CartManager failed to adequately inform consumers and 
merchants that it collected and rented this information and that 
such actions were contrary to many of the merchants’ privacy 
policies.57  As a result of this case, companies and service providers 
are now obligated to sync their individual privacy policies to avoid 
liability for any discrepancies.58 
In a recent case, the FTC pursued an enforcement action 
against ControlScan, a company that verifies the privacy security of 
online retailers.59  ControlScan acted as an independent auditor of 
merchant websites and placed seals on the sites to provide 
consumers with an indication of the level of the sites’ security and 
privacy controls.60  The FTC charged that ControlScan misled 
consumers about how often it monitored sites and the steps it took 
to verify the sites’ security and privacy controls.61  The settlement 
barred ControlScan from engaging in its certification practice and 
ordered them to pay $750,000, which was reduced to $102,000 due 
to the company’s inability to pay the larger sum.62  
 
 54. Internet Service Provider Settles FTC Privacy Charges, FED. TRADE COMM’N 
(Mar. 10, 2005), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/03/cartmanager.shtm. 
 55. Id.  CartManager is the site that manages the “shopping cart” and “check 
out” pages of online merchants.  Id. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. (quoting Lydia Parnes, Acting Director of the FTC’s Bureau of 
Consumer Protection, as saying that “[c]ompanies and service providers must 
make sure that their privacy policies are in sync . . . .  A service provider cannot 
secretly collect and rent consumers’ personal information, contrary to a 
merchant’s privacy policy.  At the same time, merchants have an obligation to 
know what their service providers are doing with consumers’ personal 
information”). 
 59. Online Privacy and Security Certification Service Settles FTC Charges, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/02/controlscan.shtm. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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3. The Future of the FTC’s Involvement   
The FTC will continue to support industry self-regulation 
rather than government-imposed regulation to keep pace with the 
dynamic online marketplace.63  On December 1, 2010, after a series 
of public roundtables and comment periods, the FTC issued a 
report that details its new approach to privacy.64  The report 
attempts to balance the privacy interest of consumers while 
encouraging industry innovation65 by addressing a number of key 
issues: 
•the collection and use of consumer information—both 
online and offline—is ubiquitous, and far more extensive 
than many consumers know. 
•consumers lack the understanding and ability in 
today’s environment to make truly informed choices about 
the collection and use of their data. 
•even in today’s environment of ubiquitous social 
networking, privacy is important to consumers. 
•the collection and use of consumer information 
provides significant benefits [to consumers, including] 
personalized advertising and other services, and, 
importantly, it underwrites so much of the free content 
available to consumers online. 
•and . . . the distinction between [personally identifying 
information (PII)] and non-PII is blurring.66 
 In response to these concerns, the report explores three self-
regulatory proposals: privacy by design, transparency, and 
consumer choice.67  Despite the FTC’s continued affirmation of 
 
 63. See Brill, supra note 24, at 5.  
 64. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2010), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf. 
 65. Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks Regarding the 
Preliminary FTC Staff Privacy Report 1 (Dec. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Leibowitz 
Remarks], available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz
/101201privacyreportremarks.pdf (“The FTC wants to help ensure . . . that the 
growing, changing, thriving information marketplace is built on a framework that 
promotes privacy, transparency, business innovation and consumer choice.”).  
 66. See Brill, supra note 24, at 3–4. 
 67. Id. at 4 (explaining that “privacy by design” means building security and 
privacy “into commercial technologies and information practices from the 
outset”).  Brill also discussed the need for transparency through better privacy 
policies “that are shorter, more comprehensible, and more consistent.”  Id.  Lastly, 
Brill addressed the need for increased consumer choice through privacy notices 
that focus on the “unexpected” use of consumer data and a “centralized ‘Do Not 
12
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self-regulation to protect online privacy, it recognizes its 
limitations, particularly in the areas of behavioral advertising and 
teen privacy.68 
B. Federal Statutes 
The United States lacks comprehensive national privacy 
legislation.  The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(COPPA) and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) 
are two of the primary federal statutes that provide remedies to 
individual online consumers for privacy infringement.   
1. The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
Congress enacted COPPA in 199869 after the FTC reported 
widespread abuse among operators of websites targeting children 
in the collection and use of personally identifying information.70  In 
the following year, the FTC issued its Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Rule (the Rule), which became effective on April 21, 
2000.71  The FTC report that prompted Congress to enact the law 
revealed that website operators were easily able to engage children 
directly, without parental supervision, to obtain personal 
information for marketing purposes.72 
The primary goal of COPPA is to give parents control over 
what type of information is collected from their children online 
and how that information may be used.73  COPPA is significant 
because it is the first federal law to impose substantial obligations 
on website operators.  The Rule applies to operators of commercial 
 
Track’ mechanism that would give consumers some control over the extent to 
which their online behavior is tracked.”  Id.  See also Leibowitz Remarks, supra note 
65, at 6 (“The most practical method would likely involve the placement of a 
persistent setting on the consumer’s browser, signaling the consumer’s choices 
about whether or not to be tracked.”).  
 68. See Brill, supra note 24, at 6. 
 69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6508 (2006). 
 70. JANE K. WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 14–36, 
37 (4th ed. Supp. 2009).  
 71. 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–312.12 (2010). 
 72. WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 70, at 14–37 (“[A]ccording to the FTC data, 
97 percent of parents whose children used the Internet believed that Web sites 
should not sell or rent personal information relating to children, and 72 percent 
objected to a Web site’s requesting a child’s name and address when the child 
registers at the site, even if that information is only used internally.”).   
 73. Frequently Asked Questions About the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N (Oct. 7, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/coppafaqs.shtm. 
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websites and online services directed to children under thirteen 
years of age that collect personal information,74 operators of 
general audience sites that knowingly collect personal information 
from children under thirteen years of age, and operators of general 
audience sites that have a separate children’s area and that collects 
personal information from children under thirteen years of age.75  
Operators covered by COPPA and the Rule must: 
• post a privacy policy on the homepage of the website and 
link to the privacy policy on every page where personal 
information is collected;76 
• provide notice about the site’s information collection 
practices to parents77 and obtain ”verifiable parental consent”78 
before collecting personal information from children;79 
• give parents a choice as to whether their child’s personal 
information will be disclosed to third parties;80  
 
 74. 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8) (defining personal information as “individually 
identifiable information about an individual collected online, including . . .(A) a 
first and last name; (B) a home or other physical address including street name 
and name of a city or town; (C) an e-mail address; (D) a telephone number; (E) a 
Social Security number; (F) any other identifier that the Commission determines 
permits the physical or online contacting of a specific individual; or (G) 
information concerning the child or the parents of that child that the website 
collects online from the child and combines with an identifier described in this 
paragraph”). 
 75. 15 U.S.C. § 6502; see also Children’s Online Privacy, BCP Business Center, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/childrens.html (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2011) (providing legal resources that pertain to children’s online 
privacy). 
 76. 16 C.F.R. § 312.3(a). 
 77. DONALD S. CLARK, SECRETARY, FED. TRADE COMM’N, CHILDREN’S ONLINE 
PRIVACY PROTECTION RULE: FINAL RULE AMENDMENT 9, 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/04/050420coppafinalrule.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 
2011) (“The Rule . . . require[s] that operators make certain third-party 
disclosures to the public [including] provid[ing] parents with notice of their 
information practices.”). 
 78. 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(b); see also CLARK, supra note 77, at 2 (explaining the 
Rule’s requirement that operators make reasonable efforts in light of currently 
available technology to ensure that the operator has achieved “verifiable” 
consent).  The FTC uses a sliding scale approach to determine what efforts are 
reasonable to balance the costs imposed by the method of obtaining parental 
consent and the risks associated with the intended uses of information.  Id. at 2–6.  
A less rigorous means of verifiable consent will be required if the information is 
only to be used internally, while a more rigorous means will be required if the 
information is disclosed to a third party.  Id.  The sliding scale provision was 
originally set to expire on April 21, 2002, but was extended for an additional three 
years.  Id.  In 2005, the sliding scale provision was extended indefinitely.  Id. 
 79. 16 C.F.R. § 312.3(b). 
 80. See id. § 312.6 (a)(2). 
14
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• provide parents access to their child’s personal information 
and the opportunity to require the operator to delete the child’s 
personal information and opt-out of future collection or use of 
the information;81 
• not condition a child’s participation in a game, contest or 
other activity on the child’s disclosing more personal 
information than is reasonably necessary to participate in that 
activity;82 and 
• maintain the confidentiality, security, and integrity of 
personal information collected from children.83 
The FTC is responsible for enforcement of the COPPA and 
the Rule through section 5 of the FTCA.84  In 2000, the FTC filed its 
first COPPA enforcement action when it amended a complaint in 
an existing case against Toysmart.com (Toysmart).85  Through its 
website, Toysmart collected detailed personal information, 
including names, email addresses, and ages of children under 
thirteen years of age without notifying parents or obtaining 
parental consent.86  The settlement of that complaint required 
Toysmart to immediately delete or destroy all information collected 
in violation of COPPA.87 
Since the Toysmart settlement, the FTC has pursued fifteen 
additional cases asserting violations of COPPA.88  Historically, the 
civil penalties range from $10,000 to $1 million in more recent 
cases.89  Yet, critics argue that the FTC has failed to timely act on 
complaints in recent years.90  Furthermore, COPPA has failed to 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. § 312.3(d). 
 83. Id. § 312.3(e). 
 84. 15 U.S.C. § 6505 (2006). 
 85. FTC Announces Settlement with Bankrupt Website, Toysmart.com, Regarding 
Alleged Privacy Policy Violations, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 21, 2000), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/toysmart2.shtm.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Legal Resources: Privacy and Security: Children’s Online Privacy, BCP 
Business Center, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives
/childrens_enf.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2011). 
 89. See, e.g., Sony BMG Music Settles Charges Its Music Fan Websites Violated the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2008), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/12/sonymusic.shtm; Xanga.com to Pay $1 Million for 
Violating Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 7, 
2006), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/09/xanga.shtm (providing examples of 
recent cases with $1 million civil penalties). 
 90. See An Examination of Children’s Privacy: New Technologies and the Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA): Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., 
15
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keep pace with emerging social networking services and the 
“extensive data collection of both the trivial and the intimate 
information that children . . . share” over the Internet.91   
Most social network services, such as Facebook, MySpace, and 
Twitter, prohibit participation by children that are thirteen years of 
age or under, which makes them generally exempt from the 
requirements of COPPA.92  However, consumer rights advocates 
argue that COPPA should be extended to cover adolescents 
between the ages of thirteen and eighteen, because of their active 
participation in social networking and digital media.93  Critics argue 
that social networking sites are making it increasingly difficult to 
navigate privacy policies and privacy settings, leading adolescent 
consumers to reveal their personal information.94  Furthermore, 
adolescents are more likely to be impulsive than adults and may be 
less likely to think about the consequences of disclosing personal 
information.95  Accordingly, consumer protection groups are 
urging the FTC to consider expanding the application of the 
Rule.96   
 
 
and Transp. and the S. Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety, and Ins., 111th Cong. 
40–47 (2010) [hereinafter Children’s Privacy Hearing] (statement of Marc 
Rotenberg, Executive Director, EPIC), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys
/pkg/CHRG-111shrg66284/pdf/CHRG-111shrg66284.pdf (testifying about the 
limitations of COPPA and the need to expand privacy protections).  Rotenberg 
claims that EPIC has filed complaints that have gone unanswered by the FTC, even 
as other federal entities have deemed the offending companies to be in violation 
of COPPA.  Id. 
 91. Id. at 43. 
 92. See, e.g., id. at 43 n.14 (showing Facebook as an example of a social 
network service that requires users to be at least thirteen years of age). 
 93. Id. at 45–46; Children’s Privacy Hearing, supra note 90, at 38–40 (statement 
of Kathryn C. Montgomery, Ph.D., Professor, School of Communication,  
American University). 
 94. Children’s Privacy Hearing, supra note 90, at 42 (statement of Marc 
Rotenberg) (testifying that EPIC raised this concern in a recently filed “friend of 
the court” brief regarding the business practices of Facebook); Children’s Privacy 
Hearing, supra note 90, at 39 (statement of Kathryn C. Montgomery) (“Social 
networks have created privacy settings that create a false sense of security for teens.  
While young people may believe they are protecting their privacy, they remain 
totally unaware of the nature and extent of data collection, online profiling, and 
behavioral advertising that are becoming routine in these online communities.”).   
 95. Brill, supra note 24, at 6 (noting that the consequences include identity 
theft, adverse consequences for college applications or employment opportunities, 
and can “open the door to bullies or predators”).  
 96. Children’s Privacy Hearing, supra note 90, at 40–47 (statement of Mark 
Rotenberg). 
16
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The flexibility of COPPA’s basic framework permits the FTC to 
ensure that the law addresses new ways of collecting personal 
information from children.97  Despite the FTC’s typical practice of 
reviewing its regulatory rules every ten years, the FTC announced 
to Congress on April 29, 2010, that it will accelerate the review of 
the COPPA Rule to ensure that it adequately protects online 
privacy for children.98  The public comment period99 and Review 
and Roundtable have passed, but, as yet, there is no indication of 
whether the FTC will act to revise the Rule.   
2. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
Subject to certain exceptions, the ECPA (more specifically, the 
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701) prohibits a person 
or entity providing an “electronic communication service”100 from 
“knowingly divulging[ing] to any person or entity the contents of a 
communication while in electronic storage by that service.”101  It 
also prohibits a person or entity providing a “remote computing 
service to the public”1020020from knowingly divulging the contents 
of certain communications.103  As to both providers of electronic 
communication services and remote computing services, the statute 
prohibits the knowing disclosure of “a record or other information 
pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service . . . to any 





 97. Children’s Privacy Hearing, supra note 90, at 5 (statement of Kathryn C. 
Montgomery). 
 98. Children’s Privacy Hearing, supra note 90, at 12 (statement of Jessica Rich, 
Deputy Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission). 
 99. See Public Comment(s) on the Federal Trade Commission’s Implementation of the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) Through the Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Rule (COPPA Rule), FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/os
/comments/copparulerev2010/index.shtm (last visited Mar. 14, 2011) (compiling 
a list of the comments received during the public comment period). 
 100. An “electronic communications service” is “any service which provides to 
users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.”  18 
U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006). 
 101. Id. § 2702(a)(1). 
 102. A “remote computing service” is “the provision to the public of computer 
storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications system.”  
Id. § 2711. 
 103. Id. § 2702(a)(2). 
 104. Id. § 2702(a)(3). 
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The statute provides for a private cause of action by persons 
“aggrieved by any violation” of the statute.105  In such a case, the 
prevailing plaintiff may obtain “such preliminary and other 
equitable or declaratory relief as may be appropriate,”106 an amount 
equal to his or her actual damages and any profits made by the 
defendant as a result of the violation of the ECPA, “but in no 
case . . . less than the sum of $1,000” and plaintiff’s reasonable 
attorney’s fees and costs.107 
3. Pending Legislation 
On May 4, 2010, former Representative Rick Boucher (D-Va.) 
and Representative Cliff Stearns (R-Fla.) released a draft of privacy 
legislation that would require greater disclosure of privacy practices 
and consumer consent to collect and use certain kinds of personal 
information.108  The proposed legislation requires greater notice to 
consumers by obligating any company that collects personally 
identifying information about individuals to conspicuously display a 
clearly written, understandable privacy policy explaining how 
information is collected, used, and disclosed.109  The bill also 
provides that most personally identifying information would be 
subject to “opt-out” rules, meaning companies would be permitted 
to collect information about individuals, unless the individual 
affirmatively opts out of that collection.110   
However, the bill would require express “opt-in” consent to 
knowingly collect sensitive information about an individual, 
including information that relates to an individual’s medical 
records, financial accounts, Social Security number, sexual 
orientation, government-issued identifiers, and precise geographic 
location information.111  Companies would also be required to 
obtain affirmative permission to disclose information to 
 
 105. Id. § 2707(a). 
 106. Id. § 2707(b)(1). 
 107. Id. §§ 2707(b)(3)–(c). 
 108. See Best Practices Act, H.R. 5777, 111th Cong. (2010); see also Daniel Castro, 
One Step Forward, Five Steps Back: An Analysis of the Draft Privacy Legislation, INFO. TECH. & 
INNOVATION FOUND. (May 5, 2010), http://www.itif.org/files/2010-privacy-legislation.pdf 
(analyzing the draft legislation). 
 109. H.R. 5777 § 101; see also Press Release, U.S. Congressman Cliff Stearns, 
Stearns, Boucher Release Discussion Draft of Privacy Legislation (May 4, 
2010), http://stearns.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID
=183894 (providing an overview of the draft legislation). 
 110. H.R. 5777 § 103. 
 111. Id. 
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unaffiliated third parties, such as advertising networks that collect 
information about users, create profiles of the users, and target ads 
to individual users based on their profile.112  Under the bill, the 
FTC would be the main enforcement agency and would be 
required to adopt rules to implement the measure.113  States would 
also be tasked with enforcing the FTC’s rules through state 
attorneys general or state consumer protection agencies.114 
Nearly a decade has passed since Congress last considered 
consumer privacy legislation, and as a result, the proposed bill 
received a firestorm of criticism from both consumer groups and 
the industry.115  Consumer groups criticize the bill for not going far 
enough to protect consumer privacy, while at the same time going 
too far in preempting state online privacy bills, including the state 
bills that provide for private rights of action.116  On the other side of 
the debate, industry groups criticize the bill for being overly broad, 
arguing that the opt-in requirements inhibit the free-flow of 
services and content that is currently provided to consumers largely 
free of charge.117  
Rick Boucher was defeated in the November 2, 2010 elections, 
which has led many to speculate on the future of the bill.118  
However, shortly after the election, Representative Joe Barton (R-
Tex.), announced that privacy was a priority for the next 
Congress.119  Representative Ed Markey (D-Mass.) also expressed 
support for increased federal oversight of Internet privacy.120  Even 
 
 112. Id. § 104.  
 113. Id. § 602.  
 114. Id. § 603.  
 115. See Stephanie Clifford, Consumer Groups Say Proposed Privacy Bill Is Flawed, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/05/business/media
/05adco.html?_r=1. 
 116. See id; Andy Greenberg, New Web Ad Privacy Bill Riles All Sides, 
FORBES.COM (May 4, 2010, 5:18 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/05/04
/privacy-web-advertising-technology-bill.html.  
 117. See The Best Practices Act, and a Discussion Draft of Reps. Boucher and Stearns to 
Require Notice to and Consent of an Individual Prior to the Collection and Disclosure of 
Certain Personal Information Relating to that Individual: Hearing on H.R. 5777 Before the 
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H. Energy and Commerce 
Comm., 111th Cong. 7–8 (2010) (testimony of Michael Zaneis, Vice President of 
Public Policy, Interactive Advertising Bureau), available at http://www.iab.net
/media/file/Zaneis_ConsumerProtectionSubcommittee.pdf.  
 118. See Cecilia Kang, Rep. Barton Pledges Push for Internet Privacy Oversight, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2010), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2010/11
/rep_barton_pledges_push_for_in.html. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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if Boucher’s bill is ultimately dropped, some form of privacy 
legislation is likely in the future given the bi-partisan support for 
such comprehensive federal legislation. 
C. State Statutes 
1. California 
California is a key player in Internet privacy legislation.121  
California has passed two innovative laws that are the first of their 
kind at the state and federal level.122  While the California 
legislation impacts online privacy for all consumers, even those 
outside of California,123 the legislation insufficiently addresses some 
of the major concerns highlighted by consumer interest groups.124   
The California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 (OPPA) 
is the first of such ground-breaking statutes and requires 
commercial websites and online service operators who collect 
personally identifying information about California residents to 
provide those residents with a conspicuous electronic notice of 
posted privacy policies and to comply with those privacy promises.125  
Under the OPPA, privacy policies must contain certain 
information, including the following: personally identifying 
information collected, the categories of parties with whom this 
personally identifying information may be shared, and the process 
for notifying users of material changes to the applicable privacy 
policy.126  Violation of this policy may result in civil penalties, private 
suits, and even action by the FTC.127 
 
 
 121. Corey A. Ciocchetti, E-Commerce and Information Privacy: Privacy Policies as 
Personal Information Protectors, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 55, 88–89 (2007) (arguing for a new 
federal privacy law). 
 122. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West 2010); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83 
(West 2009); see also Ciocchetti, supra note 121, at 89 (discussing the California 
Online Privacy Protection Act (OPPA) of 2003). 
 123. See Ciocchetti, supra note 121, at 90, (“California law effectively acts as a 
national regulation in the sense that its reach extends beyond California’s borders 
to require any person or company in the United States (and conceivably the 
world) that operates a Web site that collects [PII] from California consumers [to 
comply with the California law].” (citation omitted)).  It can be difficult to 
distinguish between California consumers and consumers in other states, forcing 
many online businesses to post privacy policies to avoid any possible violations. 
 124. See infra notes 128–130 and accompanying text. 
 125. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Ciocchetti, supra note 121, at 90 n.154. 
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss4/12
  
2011] PUTTING THE GENIE BACK IN THE BOTTLE 1691 
While the OPPA notice requirement has broad-reaching 
effects for website operators across the nation with regard to the 
notice requirement, the legislation has caused little impact on 
actual data collection practices.128  OPPA’s privacy policy 
requirement is ineffective for a number of reasons.129  Such policies 
are often difficult for the average user to understand and users 
rarely read them in practice because it would simply take too long 
to actually read all the privacy policies applicable to users’ Internet 
activities.130  Furthermore, privacy policies falsely “lead consumers 
to believe that their privacy is protected” when it may not be.131  
Finally, “there is not enough market differentiation” to inform 
consumer choice and most users have difficulty weighing the costs 
and benefits associated with sharing personally identifying 
information.132 
Shortly after California enacted OPPA, the state legislature 
passed another trailblazing Internet privacy law, the “Shine the 
Light” law.133  Under “Shine the Light,” all non-financial businesses 
(including online businesses) with twenty or more employees that 
conduct business with California residents must disclose certain 
information-sharing practices to their consumers.134  According to 
the law, businesses that have shared consumer information with 
third parties for marketing purposes within the last twelve months 
must provide instructions about how the consumer can make a 
disclosure request.135  If a consumer makes a disclosure request, the 
business must supply the consumer with information about the 
disclosures made by the business, including the categories of 
personal information disclosed to third parties and the list of 
companies to which the consumer’s personal information was 
disclosed for marketing purposes within the last calendar year.136  If 
a business fails to respond to a disclosure request, the customer 
may collect a civil penalty of up to $500 or a civil penalty of up to 
 
 128. UC BERKELEY SCHOOL OF INFORMATION, KNOWPRIVACY 11 (June 1, 2009), 
available at http://www.knowprivacy.org/report/KnowPrivacy_Final_Report.pdf. 
 129. Id. at 11–12. 
 130. Id. at 11. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 11–12. 
 133. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83 (West 2009).  The law went into effect on 
January 1, 2005.  See id. § 1798.83(i). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. §§ 1798.83(a), (b)(1). 
 136. Id. §§ 1798.83(a), (e)(6)(A). 
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$3,000 for willful or intentional failures.137 
While the California law is one of the first attempts to address 
“list brokerage,” which is “the compilation and sale of individuals’ 
personal information,” it also has limitations in protecting 
consumer privacy.138  First, the disclosure may be over-inclusive, 
because the information in the disclosure does not have to be 
specific to the consumer who made the request.139  Companies 
compile consumer information and “segment” that information 
into customer lists.140  General disclosures of the segmented lists are 
permissible under the law.141  Second, the purpose of the law is to 
provide information to consumers to assist them in making better 
choices about the companies with which they decide to do 
business.  However, the law places the burden on consumers to 
make disclosure requests and to decipher the information 
obtained.142  Third, the law is meant to shape consumer choice 
going forward, but it does not challenge or rectify disclosures to 
third-party advertisers that have already occurred.143  
2. Connecticut 
In 2008, the Connecticut legislature passed a privacy 
protection statute that requires any person who collects Social 
Security numbers in the course of business to create a privacy 
protection policy.144  The privacy policy must be published or 
“publicly displayed,” which means Internet companies must post 
their privacy policy on their web pages.145  The policy must “(1) 
[p]rotect the confidentiality of Social Security numbers, (2) 
prohibit unlawful disclosure of Social Security numbers, and (3) 




 137. Id. § 1798.84. 
 138. California S.B. 27, “Shine the Light” Law, EPIC.ORG., http://epic.org
/privacy/profiling/sb27.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2010). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83(a). 
 143. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83 (requiring disclosure only for 
personal information that has been disclosed within the immediately preceding 
calendar year). 
 144. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-471 (West 2010). 
 145. Id. § 42-471(b). 
 146. Id. 
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While this statute codifies certain notice standards, it is 
severely narrow in the information it protects and the businesses 
affected.147  Furthermore, any violation of the statute results in a 
nominal civil penalty of $500 per violation to be deposited with the 
state treasury.148  Such a remedy precludes a private right of action 
for the individual consumer and places enforcement responsibility 
on the Connecticut Attorney General.  In 2009, Connecticut 
considered a bill that would “set limits on companies that track 
consumers across websites to deliver targeted advertisements based 
on their behavior.”149  However, the proposed legislation was 
rejected in favor of the more narrow Social Security law. 
3. Minnesota 
On March 1, 2003, Minnesota passed the Minnesota Internet 
Privacy Law,150 the first state law of its kind in the country.151  
Minnesota’s privacy law prohibits Internet service providers (ISPs) 
from disclosing certain personally identifying information 
concerning their customers without customer authorization.152  
“The request for authorization must reasonably describe the types 
of persons to whom personally identifiable information may be 
disclosed and the anticipated uses of the information.”153  A 
consumer who prevails in an action brought under the law may be 
entitled to a minimum of $500 or a maximum of the actual 
damages incurred, as well as costs and attorney’s fees.154  While 
Minnesota is leading the way in privacy legislation of this kind, the 
legislation is limited in its ability to protect consumers in a 
meaningful way.  Much like the ECPA, the Minnesota law only 
regulates the information disclosure practices of ISPs, leaving 
private website operators largely unfettered.155  
 
 147. See id. §§ 42-471(b)–(c). 
 148. See id. § 42-471(e). 
 149. Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 917 (2009) 
(citing H.B. 5765, Gen. Assem., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2008)) (examining privacy 
statutes in the United States).  
 150. MINN. STAT. § 325M (2009). 
 151. Jordan M. Blanke, Minnesota Passes the Nation’s First Internet Privacy Law, 29 
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 405, 407 (2003) (examining Minnesota’s internet 
privacy law). 
 152. MINN. STAT. §§ 325M.02–.04.  
 153. Id. § 325M.04, subdiv. 2. 
 154. Id. § 325M.07. 
 155. See id. § 325M.09 (“This chapter applies to Internet service providers in 
the provision of services to consumers in this state.”). 
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4. Nebraska 
In 2003, Nebraska amended its deceptive trade practices 
statute to prohibit companies from knowingly making false or 
misleading statements in their Internet privacy policies.156  While 
this provision may provide a cause of action against businesses that 
fail to adhere to their Internet privacy policies, Nebraska law does 
not mandate that every business adopt and implement such a 
policy.  In effect, this law may provide a disincentive for companies 
to adopt a privacy policy because doing so may only subject them to 
liability.157  However, Nebraska law does provide a general “right to 
privacy” cause of action, which may provide protections against the 
misuse of personal information on the Internet.158 
5. Nevada 
Nevada joins Massachusetts and California as one of the more 
proactive and aggressive states in terms of its Internet privacy 
regulations.  In January 2010, Nevada enacted a new law requiring 
all businesses to encrypt personally identifiable customer 
information, including Social Security numbers, driver’s license 
numbers, and credit card or other account numbers.159  Specifically, 
the law requires that any “data collector”160 transferring any 
personal information through an electronic, non-voice 
transmission (other than fax) to encrypt the information to ensure 
 
 156. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-302(a)(14) (2007) (“A person engages in a 
deceptive trade practice when, in the course of his or her business, vocation, or 
occupation, he or she . . . [k]nowingly makes a false or misleading statement in a 
privacy policy, published on the Internet or otherwise distributed or published, 
regarding the use of personal information submitted by members of the public.”). 
 157. Corey Ciocchetti, Just Click Submit: The Collection, Dissemination, and 
Tagging of Personally Identifying Information, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 553, 616 
(2008) (“[T]he . . . Nebraska laws only mandate that companies tell the truth in 
their privacy policies—a practice that may only encourage companies to fail to 
post a privacy policy rather than face the scrutiny of the state law.”). 
 158. See, e.g., Shlien v. Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Neb., 640 N.W.2d 643, 646–47 
(Neb. 2002) (noting that a student brought a right to privacy action against a 
university professor for wrongfully posting the student’s paper on the Internet 
without authorization).  
 159. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 603A.010–.215 (LexisNexis 2010).  
 160. “Data collector” is defined under the statute as “any governmental agency, 
institution of higher education, corporation, financial institution or retail operator 
or any other type of business entity or association that, for any purpose, whether 
by automated collection or otherwise, handles, collects, disseminates or otherwise 
deals with nonpublic personal information.”  Id. § 603A.030. 
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its secure transmission.161  A data collector is also prohibited from 
moving “any data storage device containing personal information 
beyond the logical or physical controls of the data collector . . . 
unless the data collector uses encryption to ensure the security of 
the information.”162  Not only does this law regulate resident 
businesses, but non-resident businesses with customers or 
operations in Nevada are subject to the requirements as well.163   
The new law places additional constraints on website operators 
collecting any “payment card” information in connection with the 
sale of goods or services.  Websites subject to this law must comply 
with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI 
DSS).164  Furthermore, Nevada’s comprehensive legislation includes 
a data breach notification law, which requires a data collector to 
disclose a security breach to the owner of the information if the 
data collector determines that personal information has been 
accessed by an unauthorized person.165   
Nevada also subjects ISPs to misdemeanor penalties for 
unlawfully disclosing certain subscriber information, with the 
exception of a subscriber’s email address, without the subscriber’s 
informed, written consent.166  Although the statute does not require 
a subscriber’s written consent for ISPs to disclose the subscriber’s 
email address, the subscriber may opt-out by providing written 
 
 161. Id. § 603A.215(2)(a). 
 162. Id. § 603A.215(2)(b).  Because of the broad statutory definition of 
“storage device,” this provision impacts the use of laptops, iPhones, Blackberrys, or 
any other electronic device capable of storing personal information.  See Philip 
Gordon, New Nevada Law Mandates Encryption of Sensitive HR Data, WORKPLACE 
PRIVACY COUNSEL (June 15, 2009), http://privacyblog.littler.com/2009/06
/articles/data-security/new-nevada-law-mandates-encryption-of-sensitive-hr-data. 
 163. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.200(2)(a) (defining “business” as anyone 
doing business in the state of Nevada); Ben Worthen, New Data Privacy Laws Set for 
Firms, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2008, at B1. 
 164. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.215(1); see also Robert V. Connelly, Jr., Are Online 
Privacy Policies Required by Law?, THE RVC BLOG (Oct. 25, 2010), 
http://www.rendervisionsconsulting.com/blog/are-online-privacy-policies-required-by-law 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2011) (analyzing federal and state laws to determine when 
online privacy policies are required by law).  “The PCI DSS is a multifaceted 
security standard that includes requirements for security management, policies, 
procedures, network architecture, software design and other critical protective 
measures. This comprehensive standard is intended to help organizations 
proactively protect customer account data.”  PCI Security Standard Documents, PCI 
SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org
/security_standards/documents.php (last visited Mar. 14, 2011). 
 165. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.220 (LexisNexis 2010). 
 166. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.498 (LexisNexis 2006). 
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notice to the ISP to prevent such disclosures.167   
6. New York 
Pursuant to New York’s Internet Security and Privacy Act, state 
agencies are prohibited from disclosing or collecting any personal 
information concerning a user through state agency websites.168  
The law also requires state agencies to provide users with access to 
their personal information and the opportunity to correct or 
amend such information.169  Moreover, the law requires the state to 
create a model Internet privacy policy, which state agencies must 
adopt and publish on their websites.170  Although these regulations 
apply only to state agencies and not to private businesses or ISPs, 
New York’s deceptive trade practices statute could be used to 
require companies to comply with their Internet privacy policies.171 
7. Pennsylvania 
Like Nebraska, Pennsylvania law includes in its deceptive or 
fraudulent business practices statute a provision prohibiting a 
business from knowingly making “a false or misleading statement in 
a privacy policy, published on the Internet . . . regarding the use of 
personal information submitted by members of the public.”172  
However, without a law mandating that each business adopt a 
privacy policy, Pennsylvania’s deceptive business practices statute 
merely creates disincentive for risk-averse companies to publish 





 167. Id. § 205.498(1)(b); see also Ciocchetti, supra note 157, at 623 n.224 (“The 
Nevada law also requires ISPs to provide a privacy notice to customers concerning 
the requirements of this statute . . . .”). 
 168. N.Y. STATE TECH. LAW § 204 (McKinney 2003). 
 169. Id. § 205. 
 170. Id. § 203. 
 171. See Ciocchetti, supra note 157, at 617 (“New York’s deceptive practices and 
false advertising statute has been used to require companies to honor their privacy 
policy promises.”); see also Anonymous v. CVS Corp., 728 N.Y.S.2d 333, 339–40 
(2001) (analyzing plaintiff’s deceptive practices claim against CVS for disclosing 
plaintiff’s prescription information despite statements made on CVS’s website 
expressing its commitment to keeping customer information confidential). 
 172. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4107(a)(10) (West 2005). 
 173. See Ciocchetti, supra note 157, at 616 (noting that the Pennsylvania law 
may only discourage companies from posting privacy policies to avoid scrutiny). 
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In 2005, Pennsylvania enacted the Breach of Personal 
Information Notification Act.174  The Act requires that any “entity 
that maintains, stores or manages computerized data that includes 
personal information” provide notice to any resident of 
Pennsylvania if the entity “reasonably believe[s]” that such personal 
information has been accessed by an unauthorized person.175  
Pennsylvania joins the overwhelming majority of states who have 
enacted similar data breach notification laws.176  While notification 
statutes ensure that individuals can take the proper steps to remedy 
a breach of their personal information, such statutes fall short of 
providing a solution to prevent the security breach in the first 
place.  Indeed, data breach notification laws have been 
characterized as laws that “deal with what happens after the horse 
leaves the barn.”177 
8. Utah 
In 2004, Utah passed the Government Internet Information 
Privacy Act, aimed at regulating governmental entities’ websites.178  
The Act prohibits a governmental entity from collecting “personally 
identifiable information” through its website unless the entity has 
taken “reasonable steps to ensure” that the governmental website 
contains a privacy policy.179  The privacy policy must, inter alia, 
disclose a summary of how the personally identifiable information 
is used, the practices related to disclosure of such information, the 
procedures by which a user may view and correct his or her 
information, and “a general description of the security measures in 
place to protect a user’s personally identifiable information from 
 
 174. 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2301 (West 2010). 
 175. Id. § 2303(a) (“An entity that maintains, stores or manages computerized 
data that includes personal information shall provide notice of any breach of the 
security of the system following discovery of the breach of the security of the 
system to any resident of this Commonwealth whose unencrypted and unredacted 
personal information was or is reasonably believed to have been accessed and 
acquired by an unauthorized person.”). 
 176. State Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13489 (last updated Oct. 
12, 2010).  Only four states, Alabama, Kentucky, New Mexico, and North Dakota, 
have failed to enact similar laws.  Id. 
 177. See Worthen, supra note 163 (citation omitted) (noting that researchers at 
Carnegie Mellon University found that data breach notification laws only reduce 
identity theft by about 2 percent). 
 178. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63D-2-101 to -2-104 (LexisNexis 2008).  
 179. Id. §§ 63D-2-103(1) to -2-103(2).  
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unintended disclosure.”180  Personally identifiable information 
under the Act includes any information that identifies “a user by (i) 
name; (ii) account number; (iii) physical address; (iv)email 
address; (v) telephone number; (vi) Social Security number; (vii) 
credit card information; or (viii) bank account information.”181 
In addition, Utah enacted the Notice of Intent to Sell 
Nonpublic Personal Information Act, which requires all 
commercial entities to disclose to customers the types of nonpublic 
personal information that a business shares with or sells to a third 
party for compensation.182  “‘Nonpublic personal information’ 
includes: (i) a person’s Social Security number; (ii) information 
used to determine a person’s credit worthiness including a 
person’s: (A) income; or (B) employment history; (iii) the 
purchasing patterns of a person; or (iv) the personal preferences of 
a person.”183  The law closely follows California’s law requiring 
businesses to disclose to consumers any personal information the 
business shares or sells to third parties for direct marketing 
purposes.184  Although not directly targeted at Internet businesses, 
these two statutes directly affect Internet transactions, particularly 
in light of the expansive growth of e-commerce. 
9. Virginia 
In light of the Virginia legislature’s findings that an 
“individual’s privacy is directly affected by the extensive collection, 
maintenance, use and dissemination of personal information . . . 
[and that t]he increasing use of computers and sophisticated 
information technology has greatly magnified the harm that can 
occur from these practices,” Virginia enacted the Government Data 
Collection and Dissemination Practices Act.185  The Act sets forth 
several principles “to ensure safeguards for personal privacy,” 
including a requirement that all information collected be used for 
the appropriate and relevant purpose for which it has been 
collected, mandating a “prescribed . . . procedure for an individual 
to correct, erase or amend inaccurate, obsolete or irrelevant 
 
 180. Id. § 63D-2-103(2). 
 181. Id. § 63D-2-102(6)(a). 
 182. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-37-101 to -37-203 (LexisNexis 2009). 
 183. Id. § 13-37-102(5)(b). 
 184. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 
1798.83 (West 2009)).  
 185. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-3800 to -3809 (West 2008). 
28
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss4/12
  
2011] PUTTING THE GENIE BACK IN THE BOTTLE 1699 
information[,]” and requiring agencies to take proper measures to 
prevent the misuse of personal information.186   
The Act also provides for an expansive definition of “personal 
information,” which includes any information relating to a person’s 
“education, financial transactions, medical history, ancestry, 
religion, political ideology, criminal or employment record,” or any 
information which “affords a basis for inferring personal 
characteristics, such as finger and voice prints, photographs, or 
things done by or to such individual . . . .”187  Furthermore, the 
Virginia statute requires all public entities with an Internet website 
to “develop an Internet privacy policy and an Internet privacy 
policy statement that explains the policy” and conforms to the 
principles of the Act.188  
10. Wisconsin 
While Wisconsin has joined the forty-five states adopting data 
breach notification laws,189 it has not, thus far, enacted any Internet-
specific privacy laws.  Although Wisconsin has created a Joint 
Committee on Information Policy and Technology tasked with 
reviewing “information management and technology systems, 
plans, practices and policies” to ensure “data security and integrity, 
[and] protection of the personal privacy of individuals who are 
subjects of databases of state and local governmental agencies,”190 it 
nevertheless trails states such as California and Nevada in its 
Internet privacy legislation.  Despite the lack of Internet-specific 
privacy laws, Wisconsin has enacted expansive industry-specific 
privacy legislation.191  Such laws cover financial information privacy, 
government records privacy, and health information privacy.192  
Because these laws do not limit their application to personal 
information stored in a particular medium, they could be utilized 
 
 186. Id. § 2.2-3800(C). 
 187. Id. § 2.2-3801. 
 188. Id. § 2.2-3803(B). 
 189. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.98 (West 2009) (requiring any Wisconsin 
business entity maintaining or licensing personal information to make reasonable 
efforts to provide notice to the subject of the personal information of any 
unauthorized access of the subject’s personal information). 
 190. Id. § 13.58(5). 
 191. See Wisconsin Privacy Laws, OFFICE OF PRIVACY PROT., http://privacy.wi.gov
/laws/wisconsin/pdf/wisconsin_general_privacy.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2011) 
(outlining industry-specific privacy laws under Wisconsin law). 
 192. Id. 
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to protect certain aspects of Internet privacy.193 
III. COMPARABLE PROTECTIONS IN FOREIGN NATIONS 
A. European Union 
While the United States remains wedded to piecemeal 
legislation and sectoral regulation of Internet privacy, other leaders 
in the global community have responded to privacy concerns by 
enacting omnibus privacy laws.  At the forefront is the European 
Union (EU), which adopted the EU Data Protection Directive on 
October 24, 1995.194  Enacted as a comprehensive scheme to ensure 
data protection across all sectors and communication mediums, the 
Directive “instructs all Member States to enact laws that ‘protect the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in 
particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of 
personal data.’”195  It is this unambiguous declaration that the right 
to privacy is fundamental which creates the divergence in privacy 
policy between the United States and the EU.  While the United 
States has balked at an outright proclamation that the right to 
privacy is fundamental and instead couches its privacy policies in 
the form of patchwork judicial decisions and legislative mandates, 
the EU has taken a more direct and comprehensive approach.196  
 
 193. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 85.103 (allowing individuals applying for a 
driver’s license or other identification card to request that the Wisconsin 
Department of Transportation maintain the confidentiality of the applicant’s 
personal information); Id. § 100.54(2) (enabling a consumer to put a “security 
freeze” on his or her credit report to prevent a consumer reporting agency from 
releasing his or her credit report); Id. § 943.201 (prohibiting the unauthorized use 
of an individual’s personal information); Id. § 943.41(3) (prohibiting credit card 
theft); Id. § 947.013(1v) (increasing the penalty for harassment if a person 
committing the harassment intentionally gains access to a record in electronic 
format that contains personally identifiable information regarding the victim). 
 194. Robert R. Schriver, You Cheated, You Lied: The Safe Harbor Agreement and Its 
Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2777, 2784 (2002) 
(noting that the European Union (EU) Data Privacy Directive went into effect 
three years later on October 25, 1998). 
 195. Id. 
 196. See Steven R. Salbu, The European Union Data Privacy Directive and 
International Relations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 655, 668 (2002) (“The European 
Union[’s] . . . Data Privacy Directive . . . created a global model of a rigorous 
legislative approach to privacy . . . in contrast to the U.S. ‘mix of legislation, 
regulation, and self-regulation.’”); Chuan Sun, Note, The European Union Privacy 
Directive and Its Impact on the U.S. Privacy Protection Policy: A Year 2003 Perspective, 2 
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 99, 104–05 (2003) (discussing the fundamental 
differences in EU and United States approaches to privacy policy). 
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The EU’s Directive begins with two seemingly inapposite 
objectives: (1) the protection of an individual’s right to privacy with 
respect to personal data; and (2) enabling the free flow of personal 
data.197  To that end, the Directive requires that any entity 
collecting personal information must do so for “specified, explicit 
and legitimate purposes,” and must collect information that is 
“adequate and relevant for the stated purpose, accurate and 
current, and maintained in personal identifiable form for only the 
amount of time needed to accomplish the stated purpose for 
collection.”198   
The most unique feature however is the Directive’s “opt-in” 
provision.  Pursuant to Article 7 of the Directive, Member States 
may process personal data if “the data subject has unambiguously 
given his consent.”199  This opt-in requirement stands in stark 
contrast to the general policy adopted by the United States, which 
permits the processing of personal data unless the individual opts 
out.  For example, in the United States, an individual must register 
with the “do not call” registry in order to avoid telemarketers; 
whereas, citizens of the EU must affirmatively consent to being 
contacted by direct marketing services.200  Thus, the United States 
default favors the dissemination and access of personal data while 
the EU’s default gives the owner of the information control over its 
dissemination.   
The Directive’s reach however does not merely implicate the 
twenty-seven EU Member States.  Article 25, one of the Directive’s 
more controversial provisions, provides that Member States may 
only transfer personal data to non-EU Member States if those non-
Member States provide “an adequate level of protection.”201  This 
 
 197. Council Directive 95/46, Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 
281) Art. I (EC) [hereinafter EU Directive].   
 198. Jonathan P. Cody, Comment, Protecting Privacy over the Internet: Has the 
Time Come to Abandon Self-Regulation?, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1183, 1212–13 (1999) 
(citation omitted) (studying Internet privacy regulations). 
 199. EU Directive, supra note 197, Sec. II, Art. 7.  A Member State may also 
process personal data in situations in which processing is necessary to comply with 
legal orders or contracts or in other narrow exceptions.  Id. 
 200. See Seagrumn Smith, Microsoft and the European Union Face Off Over Internet 
Privacy Concerns, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 14, http://www.law.duke.edu
/journals/dltr/articles/2002dltr0014.html (“This opt-out versus opt-in debate 
reflects a major philosophical difference in how the EU and U.S. regard personal 
data privacy . . . .”). 
 201. EU Directive, supra note 197, Art. 25. 
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far-reaching provision caught the attention of the Clinton 
administration, which began negotiations with the EU to establish a 
“Safe Harbor” framework that would ensure that the Directive did 
not interrupt data flow from the EU to the United States.202  By July 
2000, the U.S. Department of Commerce had successfully 
negotiated the agreement through the EU, which voted to approve 
the Safe Harbor principles despite objection from a majority of the 
European Parliament.203  Although membership in the Safe Harbor 
is voluntary, companies that do certify with the U.S. Department of 
Commerce agree that they will comply with the Safe Harbor 
principles.204  Participants in the Safe Harbor are assured that their 
privacy protections will be “deemed adequate” and in compliance 
with the Directive, thus ensuring that data flow from the EU to the 
United States continues uninterrupted.205 
In an effort to supplement the EU Directive to address 
concerns of an increasingly electronic global environment, the 
European Commission (EC) adopted the Electronic Privacy 
Directive (e-Privacy Directive) in 2002.206  The e-Privacy Directive 
retains the opt-in approach utilized by the original Directive by 
allowing “the use of automatic calling machines, faxes, or e-mail for 
purposes of direct marketing . . . only for those subscribers who 
have given their prior consent.  In other words, the EU has adopted 
an opt-in approach to spam.”207  Furthermore, the e-Privacy 
Directive “prohibits companies from taking personal data from 
websites or finding the location of satellite-linked mobile telephone 
 
 202. Salbu, supra note 196, at 678. 
 203. Id. at 679–80 (noting that the European Parliament was skeptical of the 
Safe Harbor because it lacked an independent body capable of adjudicating 
violations).   
 204. See Schriver, supra note 194, at 2790–91 (enumerating the Safe Harbor 
principles, including the requirements that participating companies must give 
individuals the choice as to whether their personal information will be disclosed to 
third parties and that individuals must be given access to their personal 
information and the ability to correct or delete any inaccurate information).  
 205. Id. at 2789–90. 
 206. Directive 2002/58, Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the 
Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. (L 207) 
(EC), amended by Directive 2009/136, 2009 O.J. (L 337) (EC). 
 207. George B. Delta & Jeffrey H. Matsuura, European E-Commerce Initiatives, in 
LAW OF THE INTERNET § 13.11, at 13-128 (2010); see also Ariella Mutchler, Note, 
CAN-SPAM Versus the European Union E-Privacy Directive: Does Either Provide a Solution 
to the Problem of Spam?, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 957, 972 (“[O]ne exception to the 
opt-in rule allows e-mail solicitation when the marketer obtains the e-mail address 
in the context of a sale of goods or services.”). 
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users.”208 
In light of rapid advancements in technology and a generation 
immersed in social networking, the EC recently announced its 
intent to update the fifteen-year-old Directive, which will include 
revisions to the e-Privacy Directive.209  The EC’s overhaul will 
include efforts to make it easier for individuals to access, correct, 
and delete their personal information, and will implement a more 
stringent enforcement regime for privacy violations.210 
B. United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom (UK) enacted the Data Protection Act of 
1998 to establish a framework to comply with the EU Directive.211  
The UK established the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) 
as an independent authority assigned to be directly responsible for 
implementing the Data Protection Act.212  The principles of the Act 
closely mirror those of the EU Directive, including requirements 
for fair and lawful processing of personal data and protections 
against electronic marketing messages (whether phone, fax, or 
email).213 
Although the UK’s Internet privacy laws are facially compliant 
with the EU Directive, the UK has been under intense scrutiny 
recently for failing to enforce these privacy principles.  In 
September 2010, the EC referred the UK to the European Court of 
 
 208. Delta & Matsuura, supra note 207, at 13-128. 
 209. Drew Singer, EU Calls for Stronger Internet Privacy Laws, JURIST (Nov. 4, 2010, 
10:36 AM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/11/eu-calls-for-stronger-internet-
privacy-laws.php. 
 210. EUROPEAN COMM’N, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS: A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH ON 
PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 2, (2010), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0006/com_2010_609_en.pdf 
(“[R]apid technological developments and globalisation have profoundly changed 
the world around us, and brought new challenges for the protection of personal 
data.”). 
 211. See INFO. COMM’RS OFFICE, THE GUIDE TO DATA PROTECTION, 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protection/Practical
_application/THE_GUIDE_TO_DATA_PROTECTION.ashx. 
 212. Id. at 11–12. 
 213. Id. at 37–39; see also INFO. COMM’RS OFFICE, PRIVACY AND ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS (EU DIRECTIVE) REGULATIONS 2003: WHEN AND HOW TO 
COMPLAIN ABOUT ELECTRONIC MARKETING MESSAGES, http://www.ico.gov.uk/~
/media/documents/library/Privacy_and_electronic/Introductory/PECR%20HO
W%20TO%20COMPLAIN%20FINAL.ashx (stating that the Privacy and Electronic 
Communications Regulations of 2003 govern electronic marketing). 
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Justice for failing to comply with the EU regulations protecting the 
privacy of electronic communications.214  Specifically, the EC found 
that UK privacy laws were not being properly implemented with 
respect to “Phorm,” a system used by UK Internet service providers 
to “monitor user web-surfing habits and deliver personalized 
advertising without the user’s consent.”215  The EC launched an 
infringement proceeding in April 2009 to address the UK’s 
deficiencies, citing lax standards with regard to obtaining an 
individual’s consent to have their personal information 
intercepted.216  The EC requires that Member States have 
“procedures in place to ensure ‘clear consent from the user that his 
or her private data is being used.’”217  Although the UK put a halt to 
“Phorm” after the EC’s infringement proceedings, the EC has 
nonetheless initiated legal proceedings in the European Court of 
Justice, calling for an overhaul of UK privacy laws.218 
C. Canada 
Although Canada generally shares the United States’ affinity 
for self-regulation with respect to privacy law, it nevertheless has 
established its own omnibus regulation for the protection of 
personal data.219  The Canadian Standards Association Model Code 
for the Protection of Personal Information (Model Code) was 
established in part to comply with the EU Directive.220  The tenets 
of the Model Code have now been incorporated into the Personal 
 
 214. Megan McKee, EU Suing UK over Internet Privacy, JURIST (Sept. 30, 2010, 3:23 
PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/09/eu-suing-uk-over-internet-privacy.php; 
Darren Waters, EC Starts Legal Action over Phorm, BBC NEWS (Apr. 14, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7998009.stm. 
 215. McKee, supra note 214. 
 216. See Waters, supra note 214 (“At the heart of the legal action by the EC is 
whether users have given their consent to have their data intercepted by the 
advertising system.”); Telecoms: Commission Launches Case Against UK over Privacy and 
Personal Data Protection, EUROPA (Apr. 14, 2009), available at http://europa.eu
/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/570&format=HTML&aged=0&
language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
 217. Waters, supra note 214. 
 218. McKee, supra note 214 (“Specifically, current UK law does not provide for 
an independent national authority to supervise the interception of some 
communications, it allows for communications to be received without fulfilling the 
EU definition of consent and it does not have a mechanism that ensures sanctions 
for unlawful unintentional interception, as required by EU law.”). 
 219. Cody, supra note 198, at 1215–16. 
 220. Id. at 1216 (“[The Model Code] establishes ten practice principles that 
must be adopted as a whole by those who wish to participate . . . .”). 
34
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss4/12
  
2011] PUTTING THE GENIE BACK IN THE BOTTLE 1705 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
(PIPEDA).221  Similar to the United States’ Safe Harbor, 
participation in the PIPEDA is voluntary.222  The PIPEDA standards 
very closely mirror the EU Directive principles, requiring that 
organizations collect, use, and disclose personal information by fair 
and lawful means, only with an individual’s consent, and only for 
limited purposes.223  Individuals also have the right to access their 
personal information and correct any inaccurate information.224  
PIPEDA also establishes recourse for individuals who believe their 
rights under the Act have been violated by allowing those 
individuals to file a complaint with the Privacy Commissioner.225 
Recently, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner conducted a 
symposium on Internet Privacy Law in Canada, after which the 
Privacy Commissioner released a review of PIPEDA, including 
recommendations for updating and improving the Act.226  While 
the Privacy Commissioner found that “PIPEDA is working 
reasonably well,” it made nine recommendations to address certain 
deficiencies.227  The recommendations included a call to improve 
anti-spam legislation.228  Noting that Canada was the only G-8 
nation without specific anti-spam legislation, the Privacy 
Commissioner warned that this deficiency was “undermining 
confidence in the Internet and even prompting some people to 
 
 221. Principles in Summary: View Privacy Code, CSA, http://www.csa.ca/cm
/ca/en/privacy-code/publications/view-privacy-code/article/principles-in-
summary (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).  
 222. See Introduction: View Privacy Code, CSA, http://www.csa.ca/cm/ca/en
/privacy-code/publications/view-privacy-code/article/introduction (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2011) (“The [Privacy] Standards address[] two broad issues: the way 
organizations collect, use, disclose, and protect personal information; and the 
right of individuals to have access to personal information about themselves, and, 
if necessary, to have the information corrected.”). 
 223. OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMM’R OF CAN., YOUR GUIDE TO PIPEDA, available 
at http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/02_05_d_08_e.pdf.  
 224. Id. 
 225. See id.  “[U]nder certain circumstances, [aggrieved individuals may also] 
take [a] complaint to the Federal Court of Canada [if the Privacy Commissioner 
failed to resolve the dispute.]”). 
 226. The Privacy Commissioner of Canada’s Position at the Conclusion of the Hearings 
on the Statutory Review of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
(PIPEDA), 8 PRIVACY & INFO. L. REP. 3, 4 (2007), available at 
http://www.priv.gc.ca/parl/2007/sub_070222_e.cfm (recommending changes to 
PIPEDA). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
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abandon electronic commerce.”229 
IV. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNET PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 
THROUGH LITIGATION 
A. DoubleClick 
In 1999, Internet users brought a class action lawsuit against 
DoubleClick, the market leader in online advertising, in one of the 
first Internet privacy suits to be decided on the merits.230  The users 
contended that DoubleClick placed “cookies”231 on users’ hard 
drives each time the users visited any one of the 11,000 sites for 
which DoubleClick provided targeted banner advertisements.232   
Plaintiffs alleged that DoubleClick engaged in the intentional 
unauthorized access of electronic communication in violation of 
Title II of the ECPA when it tracked the communications between 
the plaintiffs and the affiliated websites through use of the 
cookies.233  The court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims, holding that the 
use of cookies fell within the exception for “conduct authorized . . . 
(2) by a user of that . . . service with respect to a communication of 
or intended for that user.”234  The court found that the affiliated 
websites were “users” within the meaning of the exemption and 
that as “users” the affiliated website consented to DoubleClick’s 
access to the communications.235  The court held that it was 
indisputable that the affiliated websites had consented or 
authorized DoubleClick to intercept communications, as evidenced 
by the commercial relationship to generate revenue from 
advertising.236 
Similarly, the court dismissed plaintiffs’ claim for violation of 
the Federal Wiretap Act.237  Plaintiffs alleged that DoubleClick 
violated the act by intentionally “intercepting” electronic 
 
 229. Id. 
 230. In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001. 
 231. The purpose of the cookies was to track users’ communications with 
DoubleClick’s affiliated websites to create profiles of the users for targeted 
advertising. 
 232. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 502–03. 
 233. Id. at 510.  “Communication” means the record of the particular pages 
visited by the plaintiffs at affiliated websites and the information the plaintiffs 
provide on those websites.    
 234. Id. at 507, 511; 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2) (2006).   
 235. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 508–09. 
 236. See id. at 511–14. 
 237. Id. at 519. 
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communications between plaintiffs and the affiliated websites.238  
However, the court held that DoubleClick fell within the statutory 
exception for consent by one of the parties to the communication, 
where the affiliated websites had consented to the “interception.”239 
The court also dismissed plaintiffs’ Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (CFAA) claim for failure to plead the statutory threshold 
of $5,000 in damages for each individual class member.240  The 
plaintiffs claimed damages resulting from the aggregate loss of 
their privacy, trespass to their personal property, and the 
misappropriation of confidential data by DoubleClick.241  The court 
held that damages may only be aggregated across victims for a 
single act by the defendant, and that DoubleClick’s actions are 
properly characterized as a series of single acts that individually 
affected plaintiffs.242   
The court refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
the state law claims as a result of dismissing all of the federal 
claims.243  The parties ultimately resolved the case in a highly 
publicized settlement prior to any appellate hearing.244   
B. Intuit 
One of the first Internet privacy lawsuits brought in federal 
court was a class action lawsuit filed in the United States District 
Court for the Central District of California against Intuit, a 
developer of financial and tax preparation software and operator of 
the website located at www.quicken.com.245  In that case, plaintiffs 
alleged that a “cookie”246 was placed on their computers while 
 
 238. Id. at 515. 
 239. Id. at 514–16. 
 240. See id. at 520–26. 
 241. Id. at 523. 
 242. See id. at 524–26. 
 243. Id. at 526. 
 244. See DoubleClick Settles Online-Privacy Suits, Plans to Ensure Protections, Pay 
Legal Fees, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2002, at B8. 
 245. In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
 246. As the court noted,  
[a] ‘cookie’ is an electronic file that online companies . . . implant upon 
computer users’ hard drives when those users visit . . . Web sites such as 
Quicken[.]com . . . . Cookies generally perform many convenient and 
innocuous functions, such as keeping track of items Web site visitors may 
purchase . . . . [Cookies may] keep track of usernames and passwords to 
make it easier for people to access Web sites that require authentication . 
. . .  
Id. 
37
Frieden et al.: Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: Leveraging Private Enforcem
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
  
1708 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:4 
visiting www.quicken.com.247  On this basis, plaintiffs alleged three 
claims under federal statutes and two supplemental state law 
claims.248  Intuit filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted.249 
Plaintiffs’ first claim alleged a violation of § 2701 of the ECPA, 
which prohibits a person or entity from intentionally accessing 
“without authorization a facility through which an electronic 
communication service is provided; or . . . intentionally 
exceed[ing] an authorization to access that facility; and thereby 
obtain[ing], alter[ing], or prevent[ing] authorized access to a wire 
or electronic communication while it is in electronic 
storage . . . .”250  Intuit argued that this claim should be dismissed 
because the plaintiffs failed to allege that defendant was a “third 
party to the communications at issue” and because the plaintiffs 
failed to sufficiently plead that the defendant “accessed an 
‘electronic communication while it [was] in electronic storage in’ 
an electronic communication system.”251  The court denied the 
motion as to the ECPA claim, holding that the statute does not 
require a defendant to be a “third-party to the communications at 
issue” and that the “fact that Plaintiffs have alleged that certain 
electronic communications were intercepted in transit at one time 
does not preclude it from also alleging that other electronic 
communications were accessed while in electronic storage at 
another time.”252  However, the court granted the rest of Intuit’s 
motion to dismiss, holding that plaintiffs failed to allege facts 
sufficient to support the remaining claims.253 
C. Pharmatrak 
In 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit considered a case brought against a number of 
pharmaceutical companies which raised “important questions 
about the scope of privacy protection afforded internet users under 
 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 1273. 
 250. Id. at 1275. 
 251. Id. (footnote omitted).  Apparently, Intuit abandoned an argument, 
asserted in its notice of motion but not in its opening brief, that its computers 
were not “communication service providers” under the statute.  Id. at 1275 n.3. 
 252. Id. at 1275–77. 
 253. Id. at 1277–81. 
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the [ECPA] . . . .”254  The pharmaceutical companies invited users to 
visit their websites for information about their drugs and to obtain 
rebates.255  One company, Pharmatrak, sold a service to the 
pharmaceutical companies that accessed information about the 
users and collected certain information meant to permit the 
pharmaceutical companies to perform intra-industry comparisons 
of website traffic.256  Most of the pharmaceutical companies clearly 
communicated that they did not want personal or identifying data 
about their website users to be collected, and they received 
assurance from Pharmatrak that such data would not be 
collected.257  However, some users’ personal and identifying data 
was later found on Pharmatrak’s computers, leading the plaintiffs 
to file suit.258 
The district court entered summary judgment for defendants 
on the basis that Pharmatrak’s conduct was not an “interception” 
but fell within an exception to the ECPA which permits a third-
party to obtain the contents of an electronic communication where 
one party to the communication consents.259  The First Circuit 
addressed the issue on appeal. 
In reversing and remanding the trial court’s decision, the First 
Circuit noted that the ECPA amended the Federal Wiretap Act “by 
extending to data and electronic transmissions the same protection 
already afforded to oral and wire communications.”260  To this end, 
it provides a private right of action against a person who 
“intentionally intercepts,261 endeavors to intercept, or procures any 
other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, 
or electronic communication . . . .”262  The court also held that the 
ECPA’s definition of the “contents” of an electronic 
communication encompassed the personally identifying 
information at issue.263  The First Circuit found that the district 
 
 254. In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 12–13 (applying 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2006)). 
 260. Id. at 18. 
 261. For the purposes of the statute, “intercept” is defined as “the aural or 
other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication 
through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.”  18 U.S.C. § 
2510(4). 
 262. Id. § 2511(1)(a). 
 263. Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 18. 
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court had erred by not placing upon the defendants the burden of 
establishing the consent necessary to fall within the subject 
exception to liability under the ECPA.264  Moreover, the court held 
that Pharmatrak’s conduct constituted an “interception” within the 
meaning of the statute.265 
D. Post-9/11 Airline Cases 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a 
number of governmental agencies commissioned studies geared 
toward improving security at airports, military bases, and other 
installations.266  To conduct these studies, the government sought 
and obtained private information concerning airline passengers 
from a number of airlines.267  Discovery of the airlines’ disclosure of 
personal passenger information to governmental agencies 
triggered a flurry of litigation.268 
1. Northwest Airlines 
Without notifying its customers, Northwest provided the 
National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) with the 
names, addresses, credit card numbers, identity of traveling 
companions, and travel itineraries (including hotel reservation and 
rental car information) of persons who had flown on Northwest 
between July and December 2001.269  Discovery of this disclosure 
resulted in the filing of at least nine class action lawsuits—seven in 




 264. See id. at 19–20. 
 265. See id. at 22–23. 
 266. In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 304 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., No. Civ. 04-126(PAM/JSM), 2004 
WL 1278459, at *1 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004; Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corps., 334 F. 
Supp. 2d 1196, 1197 (D.N.D. 2004). 
 267. JetBlue, 379 F. Supp.2d at 304; Nw. Airlines, 2004 WL 1278459, at *1; Dyer, 
334 F. Supp. 2d at 1197. 
 268. JetBlue, 379 F. Supp.2d at 304; Nw. Airlines, 2004 WL 1278459, at *1; Dyer, 
334 F. Supp. 2d at 1197. 
 269. Nw. Airlines, 2004 WL 1278459, at *1; Dyer, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1197. 
 270. Dyer, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1197. 
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a. Minnesota 
In the Minnesota lawsuits, the plaintiffs alleged that 
Northwest’s actions violated the ECPA, the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act (FCRA),271 and Minnesota’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act.272  
The plaintiffs also asserted certain common-law claims against 
Northwest, including invasion of privacy, trespass to property, 
negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and breach of 
express warranties.273  The plaintiffs argued that the Northwest 
website contained a privacy policy which stated that Northwest 
would not share customers’ information except as necessary to 
make customers’ travel arrangements and that Northwest’s 
disclosure of passenger information to NASA constituted a 
violation of that privacy policy.274 
In response to the Minnesota cases, Northwest filed a motion 
to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to state any 
claims upon which relief could be granted.275  Under then-existing 
federal standards for pleading, the United States District Court for 
the District of Minnesota construed the allegations in the plaintiffs’ 
pleadings and made all reasonable inferences arising there from in 
favor of the non-moving party and considered each claim brought 
against Northwest.276  The court dismissed each of the plaintiffs’ 
claims.277 
(1) ECPA Claim 
With respect to their ECPA claim, the plaintiffs argued that 
Northwest’s access to its own electronic communications service 
was limited by its privacy policy and that the disclosure of passenger 
information to NASA violated that policy and, therefore, 
constituted unauthorized access to the “facility through which an 
electronic communication service is provided” as prohibited by 18 
U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1).278  Plaintiffs also argued that the disclosure 
violated 18 U.S.C. § 2702, which prohibits “a person or entity 
providing an electronic communications service to the public . . . 
 
 271. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006). 
 272. MINN. STAT. § 325D.44 (2010). 
 273. Nw. Airlines, 2004 WL 1278459, at *1. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at *6. 
 278. Id. at *2. 
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[from] knowingly divulg[ing] to any person or entity the contents 
of a communication while in electronic storage by that service.”279 
The court held that Northwest was not the provider of an 
“electronic communication service”280 and, therefore, could not be 
held liable for violating § 2702 of the ECPA.281  Moreover, the court 
held that plaintiffs failed to state a claim pursuant to § 2701 of the 
ECPA because that statute prohibited improper access to an 
electronic communications service provider of the information 
contained thereon, not improper disclosure of information.282 
(2) FCRA Claim 
In alleging their FCRA claim, the plaintiffs contended that 
Northwest or its electronic communications service provider was a 
“consumer reporting agency” and that the disclosure of passenger 
information to NASA constituted the furnishing of a “consumer 
report” to a third-party without the subject consumer’s written 
consent, which is prohibited by the FCRA.283  In finding that 
Northwest was not a “consumer reporting agency”284 and that the 
passenger information disclosed to NASA was not a “consumer 
report”285 under the FCRA, the court characterized the plaintiffs’ 
 
 279. Id. (citation omitted). 
 280. Id. (“In fact, Northwest purchases its electronic communications service 
from a third party, Worldspan.”). 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. (“There is no dispute that Northwest obtained Plaintiffs’ personal 
information properly, in the ordinary course of business.  Plaintiffs’ complaint is 
not with how Northwest obtained the information, but with how Northwest 
subsequently used the information.  Because § 2701 does not speak to the use of 
the information, it does not apply and Plaintiffs’ claims under § 2701 fail as a 
matter of law.”). 
 283. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(2) (2006). 
 284. Nw. Airlines, 2004 WL 1278459, at *3 (“‘[C]onsumer reporting agency’ 
[means] any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit 
basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or 
evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for 
the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties . . . .” (citation 
omitted)). 
 285. Id. at *3 (“The term ‘consumer report’ means any written, oral, or other 
communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a 
consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general 
reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to 
be used or collected in whole or in part for the purposes of serving as a factor in 
establishing the consumer’s eligibility for (A) credit or insurance to be used 
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; (B) employment purposes; 
or (C) any other purpose authorized under section 1681b of this title.” (citation 
omitted)). 
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FCRA claim as requiring “not liberal application of the statute, but 
wholesale disregard of the statute’s purposes and definitions.”286 
(3) Deceptive Trade Practices and Negligent 
Misrepresentation Claims 
Northwest successfully argued that plaintiffs’ claims under the 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) and for negligent 
misrepresentation were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act, 
49 U.S.C. § 41713(b), which prohibits states from enacting or 
enforcing any law “related to287 a price, route, or service of an air 
carrier.”288  In dismissing plaintiffs’ DTPA and negligent 
misrepresentation claims, the district court noted that the 
preemption doctrine “bars state-imposed regulation of air 
carriers,”289 including the regulation which might be imposed by 
state consumer protection laws.290 
(4) Trespass Claim 
Under Minnesota law, a plaintiff seeking to recover for trespass 
must demonstrate that: (1) she owned or possessed property; (2) 
that the defendant wrongfully took that property; and (3) that the 
plaintiff was damaged by the wrongful taking.291  The court held 
that the passenger information disclosed to NASA was not the 
property of the plaintiffs but of Northwest and, since Northwest 




 286. Id. 
 287. The Supreme Court determined that a law or claim “relates to” a price, 
route, or service of an air carrier where it has a “connection with or reference to” 
the airline’s rates, routes, or services.  Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 
U.S. 374, 384 (1992). 
 288. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (1994). 
 289. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222 (1995). 
 290. Nw. Airlines, 2004 WL 1278459, at *4 (citing Wolens, 513 U.S. at 227–28). 
 291. Id. (citing H. Christiansen & Sons, Inc. v. City of Duluth, 225 Minn. 475, 
481, 31 N.W.2d 270, 274 (1948)). 
 292. “It may be that the information Plaintiffs provided to Northwest was 
Plaintiffs’ property.  However, when that information was compiled and combined 
with other information to form a passenger name record (PNR), the PNR itself 
became Northwest’s property.”  Id. at *4. 
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(5) Intrusion upon Seclusion Claim 
Under Minnesota law, a plaintiff alleging intrusion upon 
seclusion must demonstrate that the defendant “intentionally 
intrude[d], physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion” 
of the plaintiff or his “private affairs or concerns” and that such 
intrusion “would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”293  
The court found that the plaintiffs voluntarily provided their 
personal information to Northwest and had a low expectation of 
privacy in that information.294  Moreover, the court found that 
Northwest disclosed the information only to a government agency, 
as opposed to the public at large, with the intent of addressing 
security concerns following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.295  
Accordingly, the disclosure would not be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person and could not be the basis of a claim for 
intrusion upon seclusion.296 
(6) Breach of Contract and Warranty Claims 
Plaintiffs’ breach of contract and warranty claims were based 
upon the privacy policy posted on Northwest’s website, which 
indicated that when users of the website reserved or purchased 
travel services Northwest would “provide only the relevant 
information required by the car rental agency, hotel, or other 
involved third party to ensure successful fulfillment of your travel 
arrangements.”297  Though the plaintiffs did not allege that they 
actually read the privacy policy, they claimed to have “relied to 
their detriment” on the policy.298   
The court held that Northwest’s privacy policy was not a 
unilateral contract because it was not sufficiently definite and the 
plaintiffs did not allege that they had actually read the policy 
before providing their information to Northwest.299  Instead, the 
court suggested that the privacy statement posted to Northwest’s 
 
 293. Id. at *5 (citing Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 233 (Minn. 
1998)). 
 294. Id. (“Plaintiffs [did] not contend that they actually read the privacy policy 
prior to providing Northwest with their personal information”). 
 295. Id. (“Northwest’s motives in disclosing the information cannot be 
questioned”). 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. at *5. 
 298. Id. at *6. 
 299. Id. 
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website was merely an unenforceable statement of policy.300  Even if 
the policy statement was “sufficiently definite” and had been read 
by the plaintiffs before plaintiffs provided their information to 
Northwest, the court held that plaintiffs failed to allege any 
contract damages arising from the alleged breach.301 
b. North Dakota (Dyer v. Northwest Airlines) 
The North Dakota action was originally filed in state court, 
“alleg[ing] that Northwest’s unauthorized disclosure of customers’ 
personal information constituted a violation of the [ECPA], 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2702(a)(1) and (a)(3), and a breach of contract.”302  
Northwest removed the claims to federal court and filed a motion 
to transfer venue or to stay or dismiss the action, requesting “that 
the action be transferred to Minnesota,” be stayed pending 
resolution of the Minnesota actions, or “dismissed for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”303 
The United States District Court for the District of North 
Dakota reviewed the plaintiff’s claims under the standard for 
considering motions under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, accepting as true all of the factual allegations set 
forth in the complaint and construing the complaint in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff.304  In his response to Northwest’s 
motion, the plaintiff conceded that, as a matter of law, no claim 
existed under 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (which prohibits “a person or 
entity providing . . . an electronic communication service . . . to the 
public” from “knowingly divulg[ing] to any person or entity the 
contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that 
service”).305  Thus, the court was left to consider only the plaintiff’s 
claims for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) (which prohibits a 
provider of “electronic communication service or remote 
computing service to the public” from “knowingly divulg[ing] a 
record or other information pertaining to a subscriber or customer 
of such service. . . to any governmental entity”) and breach of 
 
 300. Id.  The court noted that, under Minnesota law, “general statements of 
policy are not contractual.”  Id. (quoting Martens v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 616 
N.W.2d 732, 741 (Minn. 2000)). 
 301. Id.  
 302. Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1197 (D.N.D. 2004). 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. at 1198. 
 305. Id. (citation omitted). 
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contract.306  These claims were dismissed.307 
(1) ECPA Claim 
Like the court in Northwest, the United States District Court for 
the District of North Dakota held that Northwest was not the 
provider of an “electronic communication service.”308  The court 
noted that “[i]n construing [the statutory definition of ‘electronic 
communication service’], courts have distinguished those entities 
that sell access to the internet from those that sell goods or services 
on the internet” and that § 2702(a)(3) of the ECPA prescribed only 
the conduct of the former, an ISP or a “telecommunications 
compan[y] whose lines carry internet traffic.”309  Traditional online 
merchants and service providers are not providers of an “electronic 
communication service” under the ECPA.310 
(2) Breach of Contract Claim 
Like the plaintiffs in Northwest, the plaintiffs in Dyer contended 
that the privacy policy posted on the Northwest website constituted 
a contract which was breached when Northwest disclosed passenger 
information to NASA.311  The breach of contract claim asserted in 
Dyer suffered the same fate as its predecessor: the court dismissed 
the claim on the grounds that the privacy policy was not a contract; 
the plaintiffs failed to allege that they accessed, read, understood, 
actually relied upon, or otherwise considered the privacy policy 
before providing their information to Northwest;312 and the 
plaintiffs failed to allege actual damages arising from the alleged 
breach of contract.313 
 
 306. Id. at 1198–99 (citation omitted). 
 307. Id. at 1200. 
 308. Id. at 1199. 
 309. Id. at 1198–99. 
 310. Id. at 1199. 
 311. See id. 
 312. See id. at 1200.  In this way, the complaint in Dyer was even more deficient 
than the complaint in Northwest Airlines, which at least alleged that the plaintiffs 
relied upon the privacy policy.  See at *6 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004). In re Nw. Airlines 
Privacy Litig., No. Civ. 04-126(PAM/JSM), 2004 WL 1278459, at *6 (D. Minn. June 
6, 2004). 
 313. Dyer, 334 F. Supp. 2d, at 1200. 
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2. American Airlines 
American Airlines faced a nationwide class action lawsuit after 
authorizing the disclosure of passenger information to the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) without first 
obtaining the passengers’ consent.314  Plaintiffs filed suit against 
American, alleging that it had knowingly allowed unauthorized 
access to passengers’ personal information and that its agent, 
Airline Automation, Inc. (AAI), had intentionally accessed and 
disclosed such information obtained from American’s facility.315  
Specifically, plaintiffs alleged violations under the ECPA and state 
law claims for breach of contract, trespass to property, invasion of 
privacy, unjust enrichment, and deceptive trade practices.316  In 
response, defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that plaintiffs’ complaint 
failed to state a claim for relief.317  Finding that plaintiffs’ claims 
were preempted by federal law or failed to state a claim, the court 
granted defendant’s motion to dismiss all claims.318  
a. ECPA Claim  
Plaintiffs alleged that American’s agent, AAI, violated § 2701 of 
the ECPA by accessing and disclosing plaintiffs’ personal 
information from American’s facility housing passengers’ personal 
information.319  Section 2701 prohibits “unauthorized access to a 
facility through which an electronic communication service is 
provided.”320  The court summarily dismissed the ECPA claim 
against AAI because American had authorized AAI to transfer the 
data, and therefore AAI’s access was not unauthorized.321  Similarly, 
the court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that AAI violated § 2701 by 
exceeding its authorized access to American’s facilities because the 
complaint relied only on the “theory of unauthorized disclosure of 
information, not of access that exceeded what was authorized.”322   
 
 314. See In re Am. Airlines, Inc. Privacy Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 552, 554–55 
(N.D. Tex. 2005). 
 315. See id. at 555. 
 316. See id. at 554, 562.  
 317. See id. at 554. 
 318. Id. at 554. 
 319. See id. at 558. 
 320. Id. 
 321. See id. 
 322. See id. at 559 (“Section 2701 does not proscribe unauthorized use or 
disclosure of information obtained from authorized access to a facility.”).  
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Plaintiffs’ claims against American for violation of § 2702 of 
the ECPA met a similar fate.  American attempted to avoid liability 
under a statutory exception “which permits disclosure of electronic 
communications ‘with the lawful consent of . . . an . . . intended 
recipient of such communication.’”323  Plaintiffs argued that 
American’s consent was unlawful because it violated American’s 
privacy policy, which was part of the contract of carriage with 
passengers.324  Noting that the ECPA § 2702 is “a criminal statute, 
and the mere breach of a contract normally is not ‘unlawful’ in a 
criminal sense,”325 the court found that plaintiffs failed to state a 
claim against American under § 2702 of the ECPA.326   
b. Breach of Contract Claim  
Finding that plaintiffs’ breach of contract was not expressly or 
impliedly preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA),327 the 
court nevertheless found that plaintiffs’ claim failed as a matter of 
law because plaintiffs alleged no damages as a result of the 
breach.328  Although plaintiffs alleged “that they sustained injury as 
a result of defendants’ deceptive practice and invasion of privacy,” 
the court found that such damages failed to maintain a cause of 
action for breach of contract.329 
c. State Law Claims 
Under the ADA, state law “claims are preempted if they ‘relate 
to’ the prices, routes or services of an air carrier.”330  Plaintiffs 
asserted state laws claims for “trespass to property, invasion of 
privacy, deceptive trade practices, and unjust enrichment” in 
connection with American’s disclosure of their personal 
information.331  Finding that the personal information was obtained 
 
 323. Id. at 560 (citation omitted). 
 324. See id. 
 325. Id.  
 326. Id. at 561 (“Even if American was contractually bound by its privacy policy 
not to disclose passenger information and can be held liable for breach of 
contract, this obligation did not deprive it of the legal capacity under § 2702(b)(3) 
to consent to disclosure.”).  
 327. See id. at 565–66. 
 328. Id. at 567. 
 329. Id.  
 330. Id. at 561–62 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lyn-Lea Travel 
Corp. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 283 F.3d 282, 287 n.8 (5th Cir. 2002)). 
 331. Id. at 562. 
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in connection with American’s “services,” the court held that the 
ADA preempted plaintiffs’ state law claims “because they have a 
connection at least with American’s ticketing service, including the 
reservation component.”332 
3. JetBlue 
JetBlue faced a similar class action brought by passengers 
whose personal information was transferred to a government 
contractor in connection with a Department of Defense (DOD) 
study regarding airline security in the wake of September 11, 
2001.333  Specifically, the DOD contractor, Torch Concepts, Inc. 
(Torch), sought JetBlue’s “Passenger Name Records”334 in order to 
create “a customer profiling scheme designed to identify high-risk 
passengers among those traveling on JetBlue.”335  After enlisting the 
help of the Department of Transportation and TSA, Torch 
successfully convinced JetBlue to hand over its passenger 
information, even though the transfer of such information violated 
the airline’s own privacy policy.336   
Plaintiffs, passengers whose personal information was disclosed 
to Torch, brought a class action against JetBlue, Torch, and others, 
alleging violations of the ECPA, New York General Business Law, 
breach of contract, trespass to property, and unjust enrichment.337  
Defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the ground that 
plaintiffs had failed to state a claim for relief.338  The United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York agreed, 
 
 332. Id. at 564 (“Congress surely intended to immunize airlines from a host of 
potentially-varying state laws and state-law causes of action that could effectively 
dictate how they manage personal information collected from customers to 
facilitate the ticketing and reservation functions that are integral to the operation 
of a commercial airline.”).   
 333. In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005). 
 334. Id. at 304. 
 335. Id. at 305.   
 336. Id. at 305.  The passenger information disclosed by JetBlue included 
“each passenger’s name, address, gender, home ownership or rental status, 
economic status, social security number, occupation, and the number of adults 
and children in the passenger’s family as well as the number of vehicles owned or 
leased.”  Id.  
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. 
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dismissing plaintiffs’ claims.339  
a. ECPA Claim 
With respect to their ECPA claim, plaintiffs alleged that 
JetBlue’s unauthorized disclosure of plaintiffs’ personal 
information violated § 2702(a), prohibiting an electronic 
communication service from divulging the content of any 
communication maintained in electronic storage by that service.340  
Plaintiffs’ claim hinged on whether JetBlue’s Passenger Reservation 
Systems, the website maintained by JetBlue to facilitate passenger 
reservations, constituted an “electronic communication service” 
within the meaning of the ECPA.341   
Similar to the Northwest cases, the court found that JetBlue 
did not provide an electronic communication service, and was 
“more appropriately characterized as a provider of air travel 
services and a consumer of electronic communication services.”342  
In dismissing plaintiffs’ ECPA claim, the court noted that the 
operation of its website did “not transform JetBlue into a provider 
of internet access, just as the use of a telephone to accept 
telephone reservations does not transform the company into a 
provider of telephone service.”343   
b. Violation of New York General Business Law 
Plaintiffs’ second argument was premised on the theory that by 
disclosing passenger information in direct violation of its own 
privacy policy, JetBlue engaged in an unfair or deceptive act in 
violation of New York General Business Law and other consumer 
protection statutes.344  Defendants successfully argued that the 
 
 339. Id. at 330. 
 340. Id. at 306 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1986)). 
 341. Id. at 306–07 (defining “electronic communication service” under the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) as “any service which provides to 
users the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications” (quoting 18 
U.S.C. § 2510(15) (1986)).   
 342. Id. at 307–10.  The court also found that JetBlue was not a “remote 
computing service” as defined under the ECPA and dismissed plaintiffs’ claim 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2702(2) (1986).  Id. at 310. 
 343. Id. at 307 (“Thus, a company such as JetBlue does not become an 
‘electronic communication service’ provider simply because it maintains a website 
that allows for the transmission of electronic communications between itself and 
its customers.”).  
 344. Id. at 315. 
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claim was preempted by federal law under the Airline Deregulation 
Act of 1978345 because the adjudication of such a claim would 
directly impact the manner in which JetBlue communicated with its 
customers concerning reservations and ticket sales—conduct states 
are prohibited from engaging in under the ADA.346   
c. Breach of Contract Claim  
Plaintiffs based their breach of contract claim upon the theory 
that JetBlue’s privacy policy formed a contract between the airline 
and its passengers not to disclose their personal information, and 
that by doing so, JetBlue breached that contract.347  Although 
failing to persuade the court that the privacy policy was not a 
contract between the two parties but rather a “stand-alone privacy 
statement,” JetBlue successfully dismissed the breach of contract 
claim on the ground that plaintiffs failed to allege damages 
resulting from the breach.348  The court found that plaintiffs’ only 
alleged damage, “loss of privacy,” was not traditionally recognized 
in a breach of contract action.349  Without demonstrating some 
economic loss as a result of the breach, plaintiffs’ breach of 
contract claim was summarily dismissed.350   
d. Trespass to Property  
More accurately characterizing this claim as trespass to 
chattels, the court again was not persuaded by plaintiffs’ argument 
that, by participating in the data transfer, defendants intentionally 
interfered with plaintiffs’ personal property.351  Critical to plaintiffs’ 
claim was proving that the personal information transferred to 
Torch was in fact in the plaintiffs’ possession.352  Plaintiffs argued 
 
 345. 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2006).  
 346. JetBlue, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 315–16 (applying the three-part Rombom test to 
determine preemption under the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA)). 
 347. Id. at 324–25. 
 348. Id. at 325–26. 
 349. Id. at 326. 
 350. Id. at 327 (“[Plaintiffs] had no reason to expect that they would be 
compensated for the ‘value’ of their personal information”).   
 351. Id.  (“To state a claim for trespass to chattels under New York law, 
plaintiffs must establish that defendants ‘intentionally, and without justification or 
consent, physically interfered with the use and enjoyment of personal property in 
[plaintiffs’] possession,’ and that plaintiffs were thereby harmed.” (quoting Sch. of 
Visual Arts v. Kuprewicz, 771 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807 (2003))). 
 352. Id. at 327–29. 
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that JetBlue’s privacy policy, limiting the airline’s ability to transfer 
passenger information to third parties, granted them a possessory 
interest in the information because it could not be transferred 
without their consent.353  While the court remained skeptical of 
plaintiffs’ argument, it declined to decide the issue, instead 
dismissing the trespass claim because plaintiffs failed to establish 
actual injury as a result of the trespass.354  Noting that the only 
injury alleged by plaintiffs was harm to their privacy interests, the 
court found that “such a harm [did] not amount to a diminishment 
of the quality or value of a materially valuable interest in their 
personal information.”355   
e. Unjust Enrichment 
Similarly, the court found plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment 
argument equally unconvincing.  Alleging that JetBlue “received 
some form of remuneration from Torch or another party as a result 
of its disclosure of information,” plaintiffs argued that the receipt 
of such compensation constituted unjust enrichment.356  According 
to the airline, however, the only compensation it received as a 
result of the disclosure was “the potential for increased safety on its 
flights and the potential to prevent the use of commercial airlines 
as weapons that target military bases.”357  The court agreed with 
JetBlue, finding that the only benefit it received was indeed 
altruistic and dismissed plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim as a 
result.358  
V. NEW LEGISLATION SHOULD LEVERAGE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
MECHANISMS 
In an attempt to fill the void left by its failure to enact omnibus 
Internet privacy legislation, Congress delegated the responsibility 
for protecting our Internet privacy to the FTC.359  Unfortunately, 
the FTC is unable to devote sufficient resources to fully address the 
 
 353. Id. at 327. 
 354. Id. at 328–29.   
 355. Id. at 329. 
 356. Id. 
 357. Id.  
 358. Id. at 330. 
 359. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 § 1306, 15 U.S.C. § 6505 
(2006); Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).  
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issue.360  A few states have enacted statutes that may more effectively 
protect their citizens but the landscape formed by these 
enactments is uneven and replete with gaps, as the protections 
provided by each state (if they provide any protections at all) are 
different.361 
Congress’ enactment of omnibus Internet privacy legislation 
would provide a consistent standard for Internet privacy.  To avoid 
over-burdening the FTC or any other governmental body, Congress 
should leave the enforcement of its new Internet privacy law to 
private citizens. 
This concept is not new.  Congress has long empowered 
private individuals to bring suit to “vindicate important public 
policy goals.”362  The idea behind this “private attorney general” 
concept is fairly simple, consisting “essentially of providing a cause 
of action for individuals who have been injured by the conduct 
Congress wishes to proscribe, usually with the additional incentive 
of attorney’s fees for a prevailing plaintiff.”363  This concept has 
been used to address a variety of societal concerns, such as civil 
rights,364 environmental protection,365 securities fraud,366 and the 




 360. See Cody, supra note 198, at 1228. 
 361. See supra Part I.C.  
 362. Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 
183, 186 (2003) (discussing the concept of the “private attorney general”). 
 363. Id. 
 364. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 204, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (2006) (creating a 
private right of action to enforce public accommodation laws); Newman v. Piggie 
Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 401–02 (1968). 
 365. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006) 
(providing that “any citizen” may bring suit against any individual or company 
causing water pollution). 
 366. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).  The 
courts have found an implied private cause of action in this section.  See, e.g., 
Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (D.C. Pa. 1946) (using tort law 
principles to provide the basis for the plaintiff’s cause of action); see also Sean G. 
Blackman, Note and Comment, An Analysis of Aider and Abettor Liability Under 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Central Bank of Denver v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1323 (1995) (discussing the 
development of the private right of action under section 10(b)).   
 367. Social Security Act § 1862, 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(3)(A) (“[Providing a 
private cause of action to recover damages] in the case of a primary plan which 
fails to provide primary payment (or appropriate reimbursement) in accordance 
with paragraphs (1) and (2)(A).”). 
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In formulating a federal Internet privacy statute, Congress 
should be guided by the FTC’s adoption of the core principles of 
fair information practices: Notice, Choice, Access, Security, and 
Enforcement.368  Though these concepts are a reasonable starting 
place for our new statute, the first two are really the most 
important.  In a free market economy, it seems that a website user 
who is fully and accurately notified of what personally identifying 
information a website collects, stores, and discloses; how, and for 
what purpose, such information is used; how such information is 
stored and protected; and to whom such information is going to be 
disclosed can make an educated choice about what, if any, 
information to reveal to the website.  Like the statutes in California 
and Connecticut, our new federal Internet privacy law should 
require each369 website operator to clearly and conspicuously 
display370 a privacy policy that accurately notifies users of: 
• what personally identifying information is collected, stored, 
or disclosed by the website; 
• how, and for what purpose, such information is used by the 
website; 
• how such information is stored and protected by the website; 
and 
• to whom such information will or may be disclosed. 
Each website should be required to handle personally identifying 
information only in accordance with its published privacy policy 
and should be prohibited from making false or misleading 
statements in such a policy. 
Whenever the terms of a website’s privacy policy materially 
change, each user of the site should be given the opportunity to 
“opt-out”371 and require that the website handle his or her 
personally identifying information in accordance with the privacy 
 
 368. Fair Information Practice Principles, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov
/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm (last visited June 30, 2011).  
 369. Requiring each website to display a privacy policy, as opposed to merely 
prohibiting sites from making false or misleading statements in such policies, will 
eliminate the disincentive for companies to adopt such policies posed by the laws 
in Nebraska and Pennsylvania.  See supra Part II.C.  
 370. To ensure that users are given the opportunity to review the privacy 
policy, the law should require that a link to the policy be placed on the homepage 
of the website and each page which requests information from the user. 
 371. Our new federal statute would not require express “opt-in” consent to 
collect even sensitive information about an individual, thereby avoiding the 
concerns raised by industry groups about the draft Best Practices Act released by 
Representatives Boucher and Stearns.  See supra Part II.B.3. 
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policy in effect at the time that the user revealed his or her 
information to the website.  It seems only reasonable that the 
website operator who told his or her users that it would handle 
their information in a certain way before being given that 
information must not be permitted to enact an ex post facto policy 
change that may subject the users to risks they would not have 
voluntarily assumed. 
Our new federal statute should proscribe minimum standards 
for a website’s privacy practices and not preempt more protective 
state laws.372  It must provide for a private cause of action for any 
person whose information has been handled by a website in a way 
that is materially inconsistent with the terms of that website’s 
privacy policy or who has been harmed by relying upon a materially 
false or misleading statement set forth in such a policy.   
Due to the difficulty in proving actual damages in Internet 
privacy cases, the new statute should provide for statutory damages, 
without proof of actual damages.373  To encourage private citizens 
to bring suit to enforce their rights, and encourage competent 
attorneys to take on such suits, the new statute must require a court 
to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a plaintiff who prevails in 
such an action.374 
 
 372. Thereby avoiding a primary objection, expressed by consumer groups, to 
the draft Best Practices Act released by Representatives Boucher and Stearns.  See 
supra Part II.B.3. 
 373. Congress regularly provides for statutory damages where actual damages 
would be difficult to prove.  See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, 
Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 231 (1952) (“[Statutory damages are intended to allow] the 
owner of a copyright some recompense for injury done to him, in a case where the 
rules of law render difficult or impossible proof of damages or discovery of profits” 
(quoting Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 209 (1935))); Murray v. GMAC 
Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that statutory damages 
allow for the recovery of modest damages that are likely small and difficult to 
quantify, without proof of actual injury); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, 
Inc., 877 F.2d 1120, 1126 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Statutory damages are awarded when no 
actual damages are proven or they are difficult to calculate.”). 
 374. Karlan, supra note 362, at 205 (“Attorney’s fees are the fuel that drives the 
private attorney general engine.”).  The underlying policy behind awarding 
attorney’s fees is that it will encourage private individuals to bring the suit or 
encourage legal services organizations to bring such suits when the litigants 
themselves cannot afford to finance the litigation.  See id. at 205–06; see also 
Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1974) (discussing 
attorney’s fees in the context of the “private attorney general” doctrine). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Our existing federal Internet privacy protections are 
insufficient.  Congress has delegated the job of addressing our 
Internet privacy concerns to the FTC, and the FTC is unable to 
shoulder the entire burden.  Only by spreading the burden 
amongst private citizens can the Internet privacy issue be fully 
addressed. 
Congress should follow the lead of other nations in 
establishing an omnibus Internet privacy law that balances the 
needs of Internet users against those of the Internet businesses that 
drive the e-commerce economy.  At a minimum, each website 
should be required to clearly and accurately inform its users of 
what personally identifying information it collects and how that 
information is used, stored, and disclosed.  Armed with that 
knowledge, Internet users will be empowered to choose whether to 
reveal personally identifying information to websites that may 
disclose such information to third parties or use the information to 
generate revenue.  By establishing appropriate minimum standards 
for Internet privacy, without diluting existing state law protections, 
and empowering individuals to enforce those standards by bringing 
suit, Congress will enhance our Internet privacy without placing an 
additional burden on the FTC or other government agencies. 
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